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THE SOLOMONIC PARADOX REVISITED: SHOULD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DETERMINE A CHILD'S
RELIGION?
Jason S. Marks*
"With the eyes of a child
You must come out and see
That your world's spinning round
And through life you will be
A small part of a hope of a love that exists
In the eyes of a child you will see ... ,, 1
I. INTRODUCTION: "WITH THE EYES OF A CHILD"
Perhaps the most famous legend surrounding the biblical King
Solomon concerned a dispute over the custody of a newborn child.'
Two women had come to Solomon, each claiming to have borne the
child. Indeed, in a span of a few days, both women did give birth to
a child-one stillborn, the other the subject of dispute. Solomon de-
cided to resolve the dilemma by cutting the child in two, and giving
one half to each of the claimants (perhaps the first recorded "split
custody" award). One woman begged Solomon to forego killing the
child and give it to the other claimant. Furious, the other woman
asked for the split to take place. Based on the showing of compassion
by the first woman, Solomon awarded her custody. Theologians and
scholars alike consider Solomon a genius-but was he? Was the wo-
man awarded custody truly the genuine birth mother because she
* B.A., Political Science and Sociology, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1989; J.D.,
Washington University, 1992. The author would like to thank the following individuals: Susan
F. Appleton, Professor of Law, Washington University, for helpful comments on earlier drafts
and, more importantly, for introducing me to the interdisciplinary approach to family law;
Rabbi Jeffrey B. Stiffman, Temple Shaare Emeth, and Jeffrey Scheckner, Research Consult-
ant, Council of Jewish Federations, for providing the most recent data on intermarriage in the
Jewish population; Thad A. Brown, Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri, and
Stanley L, Paulson, Professor of Law, Washington University, for continual encouragement,
guidance and friendship.
1. THE MOODY BLUES, Eyes of a Child, on To OUR CHILDREN'S CHILDREN'S CHIL-
DREN (Decca Records 1969).
2. See I Kings 3:16-28.
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was willing to forego custody to save the child? Or was Solomon
simply outsmarted by a more cunning individual who played upon
Solomon's sense of compassion and justice? Family courts across the
country daily revisit the Solomonic paradox, for a shadow of uncer-
tainty hovers over every child custody award whenever "best inter-
ests" include, at least in part, a subjective judgment of what both
parents have to offer the child.' Epistemologically, can we ever feel
reassured that the decision maker has chosen the superior custodian?
And even if we could, what measurements, from an ontological
standpoint, could we employ to verify the selection is in the child's
best interest?
With the notable rise of interfaith marriages within the last fif-
teen years,4 the Solomonic paradox has an added dimension: Should
a judge, faced with determining the custody of a child, have the
power to decide the child's religious future? Should such a decision
be separate from the general grant of legal custody? And if such a
determination is in the child's best interests, what standards should
guide a judge making such a custody award? Consider the following
recurring scenario.
A. Religion and Custody
Pamela and David have been married for ten years.5 They have
three children: Adam, age eight; Rachel, age four; and Daniel, age
three. Pamela "was raised a Jew and has actively practiced her faith
since childhood." 6 David "was raised a Roman Catholic but had at-
tended Catholic services only sporadically."7 Prior to their marriage,
Pamela and David "discussed their religious differences and agreed
that any children would be raised in the Jewish faith."8 Throughout
the marriage, the family "participated fully in the life of the Jewish
faith and community." 9 Pamela and David joined a synagogue, cele-
brated the Sabbath every Friday evening, and attended high holy day
services annually. Active participants in the congregation, Pamela
3. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1987). For other discussions of the Solomonic dilemma, see STEVEN J. BRAMS,
BIBLICAl. GAMES: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF STORIES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 118, 123
(1980); Robert Mnookin & Leon Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
4. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
5. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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and David formally gave their children Hebrew names. Further,
Adam has attended Sunday School and is preparing for his Bar
Mitzvah. It is the parents' intent that Rachel and Daniel will receive
a formal Jewish education when they are of the appropriate age.
None of the children have been exposed to any religious faith other
than Judaism."
Pamela and David have separated, with Pamela filing for di-
vorce. Both parties agree that Pamela will receive primary physical
custody, and they both will share legal custody. David does not wish
to have his visitation period hindered by being obligated to take the
children to their weekend classes in Judaism. Additionally, David
would like to bring the children to his church to expose them to
Catholicism. Pamela objects, arguing such an exposure will confuse
and disrupt their formal Jewish religious education. 1
How should the judge decide this issue? Should he abide by the
oral antenuptial agreement? Should he go with the presumption that
the physical custodian should be the religious custodian? If so, what
of David's rights as a parent? As a Catholic exercising his religion?
What about Adam-does he have a right to choose? This scenario
places the judge in a seemingly untenable position: No matter what
choice is made, someone's constitutional rights will be infringed. If
the court grants religious custody to Pamela, as primary custodian or
per the antenuptial agreement, this award may infringe upon
David's religious expression under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and place the judge in the position of appearing to
endorse one religion over another, in violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 2 And furthermore, should any
court be allowed to make ex ante the religious determination for the
child? Is this in the child's best interest? Perhaps the right to choose
a religion inheres in the child, thereby avoiding a clash with the Es-
tablishment Clause, but still offending the Free Exercise Clause for
the parent whose religion the child rejects. Should a child be able to
make such a religious choice? And if so, at what age? Finally, what
of the doctrine of family privacy and parental rights-is it the place
of a court of law to make such a personal decision as the spiritual
upbringing of a child?
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 1138; Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody
Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984);
infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
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B. The Nature of the Problem
Cases like the saga of Pamela and David, though few in num-
ber in the courts, pose serious issues as the exponential growth in
interfaith marriages"3 begins to intersect with the skyrocketing di-
vorce rate in the United States.' The "best interests" standard, as
defined by state statutes and interpreted by the courts, refrains from
announcing a separate rule for "spiritual custody," choosing instead
to leave the cultivation of the religious environment with the ultimate
custodian. 5 But suppose a would-be spiritual caregiver can empiri-
cally demonstrate to a court that religious identity is so important to
a child's subjective well-being that disruption or alteration of reli-
gious upbringing has such potentially damaging ramifications that it
is in the child's best interests to be raised continually in one specific
faith. 6 If the welfare of the child is our paramount concern, should
13. This paper will focus on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. Three reasons justify this
limitation. First, it simplifies the compilation of material dealing with conflict in interfaith
marriages by exclusively centering on the problems of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. Second,
the most striking rise in intermarriage is seen today in the Jewish population, and the effect of
this trend has a much greater impact on the religious upbringing of the child, compared to
interfaith marriages between different Christian denominations, because the divergence in pa-
rental religious beliefs is at its peak. Finally, sociologists contend that the findings attributed to
the problems of the marriage between a Jew and a Gentile reflect similar problems encoun-
tered by other interfaith couples, so generalizations from the Jewish-Gentile experience are
empirically permissible. See Yisrael Ellman, Intermarriage in the United States: A Compre-
hensive Study of Jews and Other Ethnic and Religious Groups, 49 JEWISH SOCIAt. STUDIES
1, 23 (1987); EGON MAYER, LOVE AND TRADITION 23-58 (1985).
14. Recent studies estimate that more than half of all marriages will end in divorce. See
Martin and Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 1989, at
37, 37.
15. The only exception is the highly publicized case of Simms v. Simms, Case No.
87DR3301 (Dist Ct. Denver County, Colo. Dec. 29, 1987).
16. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court intimated that an
empirical showing of probable trauma by awarding custody to a child who would be raised in
a racially mixed family is insufficient to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on racial
discrimination motivated by impermissible stereotypes, even if these stereotypes have an empir-
ical basis in fact. Because no scientific studies were provided which would demonstrate the
likelihood of temporal harm to the child, the Court left unanswered whether the result would
be different. Even assuming the result would not change, I believe Palmore is not a bar to the
proposal made in this article, primarily because the Court reserves its most exacting scrutiny
for cases of invidious racial discrimination, and that such a high standard would not exist in
the religious custody context. See infra notes 155-174 and accompanying text. Further, the
source of the harm differs dramatically in the two situations. In Palmore, the alleged
harm-social stigmatization and psychic trauma associated with racial discrimination-is pre-
mised on acquiescing in socially created impermissible racial stereotypes. In the case of reli-
gious custody awards, the alleged harm-the threat to temporal welfare which a dissonant
religious environment creates-is premised on acquiescing in family created sectarian conflicts.
Palmore holds that custody awards cannot be based on the feared effects of a dysfunctional
society which has not come to terms with its racism. Nothing in Palmore, however, would
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we not create a legal rule for child custody proceedings that safe-
guards the child's spiritual health, just as the "best interests" stan-
dard protects the child's physical and temporal welfare? But given
the heightened scrutiny that any infringement upon either religious
freedom or family privacy receives, can a rule governing spiritual
custody survive a constitutional challenge?
This article will focus on these questions. Through a survey of
sociological, anthropological, and psychological research, this article
suggests that a court enhances a child's temporal welfare when reli-
gious custody vests in only one faith. After examining how state stat-
utes, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, and state courts have
interpreted "best interests," and how the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom and
family privacy, this article argues that the states should adopt the
following "spiritual caregiver" rules. Upon divorce, religious custody
shall be awarded to the parent in whose faith the child has been
raised since birth. If the child has been exposed to both parents' reli-
gions, or to no religion at all, and no prior agreement between the
parents has been made, a presumption of religious custody shall vest
in favor of the primary caregiver (or legal custodian). This presump-
tion is rebuttable upon the presentation of evidence of other factors,
including the preference of the child if judged to be mature enough
to have formed a religious identity, that indicate such a presumption
is not in the best interests of the child. This article concludes that
these rules, rooted in knowledge culled from the behavioral sciences,
promote the healthy development of the child's religious identity
without violating the Court's jurisprudence on the nature of religion
and family privacy.
II. INTERMARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
A. The Demographics of Intermarriage
It is certainly no exaggeration to assert that the intermarriage
pattern of Jews today is a startling, and to some, a troubling, phe-
nomenon.' 7 Prior to 1965, less than 10% of the Jewish population
prevent custody awards based on the real effects of a dysfunctional family which cannot recon-
cile conflicting religious preferences and prejudices.
17. Many Jewish leaders see intermarriage not simply as an issue of Jewish survival,
but more urgently, as a signal of a major transformation away from Judaism as an institu-
tional religion toward only a shared cultural heritage. See, e.g., David Firestone, Jews Seek
Stronger Identity, NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 1991, at 15; David Firestone, Marriage, Family and
Judaism, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1991, Part II, at 56; Gary Libman, At a Crossroads, Los
ANGELES TiMEs, August 6, 1991, at El; Gary Libman, Why Marry Outside the Fold?, Los
19931
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would marry outside of the faith; during the years 1965-74, the in-
termarriage rate more than doubled to 25%; this rate increased to
44% by 1984; and researchers believe that since 1985, over half of
the Jewish population is marrying outside the faith.18 The impact of
these exogamous marriages on the next generation of Jews is equally
revealing: Of the nearly two million children under the age of 18
with at least one Jewish parent, less than half are being raised in a
Jewish household. Further, of the 770,000 children of exogamous
marriages, only 28% are being raised Jewish; with 41% being raised
in some other faith and 31% being raised without any religious
identity.'
With divorce rates in the Unites States above 50%, one wonders
what effect intermarriage has on divorce. The results are mixed,
with some studies concluding that the divorce rate among exogamous
marriages is much higher than for endogamous marriages."0 Others
have found the religious factor to have been "negligible" in the mari-
tal breakup." One uncontroverted finding is that a divorced Jew is
much more likely to remarry exogamously,22 increasing the likeli-
hood that the children of that individual's first marriage will have to
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at El.
As more Jews become assimilated and move away from the traditional aspects of the faith,
authorities believe it is quite likely that their children will not only experience a low Jewish
literacy rate, but also experience an overall de-emphasis on religious identity, concomitant with
an increased exposure to a multi-religious household. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying
text. The trend of a decrease in religiously literate parents (among all faiths) coupled with an
increase in exogamous marriages will yield an entire generation of children for whom religion
will be a source of confusion, ignorance, dissonance, and divisiveness as their parents play out
their frustrations of a lost religious faith through the upbringing of their children-especially
at times of marital dissolution.
18. BARRY KOSMIN ET AL,[PUBLICATION OF THE COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
1991] HIGHIIGHTS OF THE CJF 1990 NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION SURVEY 13-14 (here-
inafter NJPS Highlights). Several social scientists have found similar rising trends in Christian
denominations. Episcopalians and Presbyterians currently have a 72% intermarriage rate,
while Baptists have a rate of 33%. Norval D. Glenn, Inter Religious Marriage in the United
States: Patterns and Recent Trends, J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 555 (August 1982). Among
Catholics, recent trends show a rise in intermarriage from as low as 34% to as high as 40%.
Andrew M. Greeley et al., A Profile of the American Catholic Family, AMERICA Sept. 27,
1980, at 155; DEAN R. HOGE & KATHLEEN M. FERRY, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTER-
FAITH MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 1 (1981).
19. KOsMIN, supra note 18, at 15-16.
20. Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Differentials in Marriage Instability: 1970,
37 AM. Soc. REV. 754 (1972); Frank D. Bean & Linda H. Aiken, Intermarriage and Un-
wanted Fertility in the United States, J. MARRIAGE & FAM., Feb. 1976, at 67, 67; Allen S.
Mailer, Jewish-Gentile Divorce in California, 37 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 279 (197.5).
21. EGON MAYER, PATTERNS OF INTERMARRIAGE AMONG AMERICAN JEWS 183
(1978).
22. Ellman, supra note 13, at 8.
[Vol. 33
SOLOMONIC PARADOX
face some level of dissonant religious upbringing in their post-divorce
household.2" In sum, the statistics reveal what the conventional wis-
dom has presumed: Intermarriage is a rapidly rising trend which
will impact upon over 40% of children in this country with at least
one Jewish biological parent. How do we account for this sudden
rise in exogamy? And given these trends, what does the prototypical
interfaith couple look like? What is the religious environment for the
children born unto parents of differing faiths?
B. The Ethnographic Dimensions of Intermarriage
Louis Berman conducted one of the earliest, and certainly one
of the most exhaustive, studies to document the trend of Jewish ex-
ogamy.24 Berman examined a plethora of factors, and drew the fol-
lowing conclusions. First, those members of minority religious
groups who live in communities in which they are but a minute pro-
portion of the population are most likely to intermarry, simply be-
cause the available pool of endogamous partners is so small.25 Sec-
ond, the college experience, especially during the first two years,
increases interfaith dating because of the exposure to persons of dif-
ferent backgrounds and the aura of curiosity of the college campus.2 6
This trend is especially true for religious minorities from small
towns, whose exposure to the cosmopolitan existence has been lim-
ited. 7 However, the more years of college one accumulates, the less
the desire to choose a mate outside of one's religious group." This
finding seems to suggest that the cultural ties of an endogamous
Jewish family are stronger than the temptations of more unre-
strained living in the college experience.29
This conclusion is reinforced by the next discernible factor,
namely that intermarriage is unlikely when one's Jewishness is "ex-
perienced as a feeling of family loyalty." 30 Berman notes that in "a
society in which exogamy is strongly discouraged, the taboo is more
likely to be violated by males, whose sex role designates a greater
degree of independence and aggressiveness," and thus one should see
23. Id. at 10-11.
24. Louis BERMAN, JEWS AND INTERMARRIAGE: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY AND
CULTURE (1968).
25. Id. at 83-84.
26. Id. at 89-90.
27. Id. at 90.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 90-91.
30. Id. at 91-93.
1993]
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a disproportionate number of male Jews intermarrying as compared
to female Jews. 3 ' Age is also a significant factor, for it appears that
Jews who intermarry do so at a later age than those who marry
within the faith.32 This phenomenon may be explained as derivative
of the closeness to the family factor noted above, and that as one gets
older and separates from familial influence, the pressure against in-
termarriage is not as great.3 3 Another interesting family-related fac-
tor is order of birth: Those who intermarry tend to be the youngest
child of the family, a finding that would seem to be explained by the
burden placed on the oldest child to perpetuate the family heritage."
A final factor, discussed below in reference to explaining the causes
of intermarriage, is the desire for upward social mobility and assimi-
lation into a predominantly Christian culture.3 5 Thus, the higher the
socio-economic status of the individual, the greater likelihood of an
interfaith marriage.36
How accurate is this profile of the "intermarrying individual"
in today's society? Egon Mayer" has perhaps performed the most
detailed study of Jewish intermarrieds one generation removed from
those surveyed by Berman. Surprisingly, the more recent surveys
have primarily reinforced the earlier conclusions. The key difference
centers on the emergence of the intermarrying Jewish woman. 8
Mayer found that, contrary to past trends, Jewish women are now
intermarrying at a rate equal to, if not in excess of, Jewish men. 9
We can assume this trend reflects not only the growing independence
of women in society, no longer bounded by cultural taboos and ste-
reotypes, but also an ever shrinking pool of available Jewish males
31. Id. at 94-95.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 95.
34. Id. at 95-97. Conversely, psychological profiles of the youngest child seem to suggest
feelings of ambition and a flair for the unconventional, either as a means to challenge the
strength of the elders or out of a sense of inferiority in being able to compete with the accom-
plishments of the elder siblings. "To excel is to rebel" may be the credo of the youngest child,
and would support the challenge to the orthodoxy of endogamy. BERMAN, supra note 24, at
97.
35. Id. at 99.
36. Id. at 106.
37. See MAYER, supra note 13.
38. Id. at 103.
39. Id. "Conversion patterns are quite different. Many more non-Jewish women con-
vert to Judaism than do non-Jewish men so the ultimate result is that in most currently all-
Jewish families the Jewish-born spouse is the husband. Jewish men marry out to a greater
degree than Jewish women but they also bring into their families a far greater number of
converts." Ellman, supra note 13, at 8. *
(Vol. 33
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in proportion to available Jewish women.4"
While supporting many of the general conclusions of earlier
studies, the more recent surveys provide empirical insight into, and
not mere speculation concerning, the connection between religious
salience, family loyalty, and intermarriage.41 Mayer relates that the
level of one's "informal and voluntary ties to one's ethnic community
in a free environment . . . reflects the values one places on those
ties." '42 Thus, the greater the bonds between a Jew and his family
upbringing as a member of a Jewish community and faith, the more
likely he or she will stay endogamous when exposed to persons of
different backgrounds. 43 Mayer notes that the "overwhelming major-
ity of the intermarriers are committed to a broad and somewhat ab-
stract sense of group continuity. This they would undoubtedly share
with non-intermarried Jews as well. However, only about one-half
share in the more specific and particular ramifications of that gen-
eral value."44
Therefore, the intensity one attaches to one's religious back-
ground is highly determinative of whether one will intermarry-and
this extends to Gentiles as well as Jews.45 This conclusion raises two
critical questions, to be addressed below. 46 What factors explain how
one develops an "intense" religious attachment? And is such inten-
sity a positive or negative social psychological trait? These are nor-
mative queries, but further objective data may "hint" at an answer.
Mayer found that "most Jews in intermarriages continued to
identify with their religion of birth," so that Jews born and raised
Jewish will identify as such throughout their lives. 47 Conversely, the
40. This increasingly shrinking pool results from the fact that, as more and more Jewish
men refuse to marry in the faith, successive generations of Jewish women find it increasingly
difficult to find a Jewish man interested in marrying a Jewish woman. Hence, if Jewish
women wish to marry and have children, the temptation to intermarry increases, and their
rates of intermarriage start to reflect those of Jewish men. While Jewish men may have chosen
to intermarry because of the pressures of assimilation and a disdain for institutional Judaism,
as discussed below, Jewish women have intermarried predominantly by attrition. See gener-
ally, BERMAN supra note 24, at 94-95.
41. See Ellman, supra note 13, at 23-26 for a thorough bibliography.
42. MAYER, supra note 13, at 93.
43. Id. at 93-94.
44. Id. at 109. These observations are supported by findings of NJPS, which "pin-
pointed two background factors as being of major influence in eventual intermarriage," specifi-
cally, "a reported lack of parental opposition to inter-dating," and a weak Jewish upbringing.
45. MAYER, supra note 13, at 133.
46. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
47. MAYER, supra note 13, at 134. Mayer suggests the following reason for the persis-
tent salience of Judaism among intermarried.
I believe that the confluence of the patterns of Jewish culture, the history
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non-Jewish partner in an intermarried couple is not only less at-
tached to the religion of his or her childhood, but is also three to ten
times more likely to convert out of his or her religion of birth to
Judaism."8 Corresponding to the finding that Jews of exogamous
marriages will have the more intense tie to their birth religion,
Mayer also discovered that "the Jewish family tradition is more
strongly represented in the intermarried family than the non-Jewish
tradition." '49
Without getting ahead of ourselves and discussing the "why" of
intermarriage and the problems exogamous partners face specifically
with regard to raising children, Mayer's data suggest that, despite
the mass movement toward assimilation in America, even those who
are so bold as to marry outside their faith still have strong ties, often
inexplicable, to their religious heritage; bonds which encourage per-
petuating that heritage, as amorphous as it may be to this individual,
through his or her children. Thus, the bridge between the social,
psychological and legal components of our inquiry is becoming clear:
The peculiar needs of the exercise of the Jewish religion, even for
those who opt for intermarriage, will likely create a desire for estab-
lishing a Jewish household, complete with its religious and cultural
heritage. 50 In marriages which are unstable, the child's welfare,
ceteris paribus,51 may actually be furthered by a legal rule which
prefers, in the case of Jewish-Gentile interfaith couples, a presump-
tion of religious custody for the Jewish parent. Before we may ad-
of Jews in America, and the social psychology of the modern Jewish family has
produced the twin results of intermarriage. Although it has increased the inci-
dence of intermarriage, it has also increased the likelihood that intermarried
couples, Jews and non-Jews, will have their group identity defined more by
their Jewish heritage than by any other ethnic or religious heritage.
But those very same forces have also increased the fragmentary nature of what
constitutes Jewish tradition and Jewish identification. Thus, although Jewish
culture survives and even flourishes in modern America, it does so less as an
integrated whole and more as a kind of grab bag of fragments from which indi-
vidual Jews choose more or less at will .. . . So being Jewish is mostly a
sometime thing. Of course feeling that one is a Jew or not a Jew is a constant
existential condition, but enacting or recollecting any of the cultural imperatives
of that feeling are only episodic and subject to- the choice of each individual.
ld. at 170-71.
48. Id. at 136.
49. Id. at 162.
50. Id. at 164.
51. This paper recognizes that divorce is a result of the confluence of many factors, of
which religion is but one. However, as an intermarriage becomes unstable, the evidence dem-
onstrates religion becomes an increasingly salient determinant of marital discord with poten-
tially devastating effects on the emotional well-being of the couple's children.
[Vol. 33
SOLOMONIC PARADOX
dress the needs of the child, however, we first must discern the inter-
nal dynamics of those individuals who intermarry: What phenomena
bring an interfaith couple together, and which of these aspects are
most likely to result in conflict as the relationship develops and
grows over time.
C. A Theory of Contemporary Intermarriage
To understand contemporary trends of marrying across racial,
ethnic, and religious lines, one must appreciate the unique composi-
tion of American society, penned by Israel Zangwill as:
[T]he great Melting-pot ... roaring and bubbling . . . stirring
and seething! Celt and Latin, Slav and Teuton, Greek and Syr-
ian-black and yellow-[Jew and Gentile]. Yes, East and West,
North and South, the palm and the pine, the pole and the equa-
tor, the crescent and the cross ... Here shall they all unite and
build the Republic of Man and the Kingdom of God.62
The "melting pot" did not yield its "American alloy" as idylli-
cally as Zangwill's elegy for multiculturalism would suggest.
Though each successive wave of immigration from Europe enhanced
the ethnic and religious flavor of the nation, the mix was certainly no
alchemist's dream.63 Prejudice and bigotry toward certain racial, eth-
nic, or religious groups were part of the baggage which immigrants
brought to their new homeland-not that such elements were lacking
in America, still incensed by the fires of slavery and Puritan mani-
fest destiny. 4 However, through diligence and perseverance, each
wave of ethnic immigrants managed to move from their initial homo-
geneous ghetto into the upper strata of mainstream America. 55 But
this move away from a communal place of origin, from "the old
country," toward a more general membership in an ethnic category,
was only a temporary locus of identity. The group cohesiveness of
the first generation became for their children-the "second genera-
tion"-a competing agent with the pressure to assimilate into main-
52. ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE MELTING POT 198-99 (1908).
53. See, eg., CHARLES SILBERMAN, A CERTAIN PEOPLE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THEIR
LIVES TODAY 40-65 (1985); JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 67-68 (1963);
see generally, OSCAR HANDLIN, THE UPROOTED: THE Epic STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRA-
TIONS THAT MADE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1951).
54. See, eg., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 51-104 (1975); KENNEDY, supra note
53, at 70-76. See generally THOMAS CURRAN, XENOPHOBIA AND IMMIGRATION (1975).
55. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELI-
GIOUS SOCIOLOGY 12-13 (Univ. of Chicago Press, ed. 1983).
1993]
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stream culture.56 Though raised in the secular American culture, the
"third generation"-grandchildren of immigrants-suffered a paral-
ysis of affiliation, strangers to their past and unsettled in their pre-
sent."7 As assimilation persisted, the attachment to religion became
more of an ethnic label, a signal of membership in some sub-group
of American society. However, the traditions of the various religions
were not as tenaciously adhered to as the group moniker. In place of
competing religious world views arose a common value system, the
ultimate product of the melting pot-the "American Way of Life."58
The duplicity of the American experience with ethnic integra-
tion-an egalitarian multi-cultural assimilation on the one hand, and
an existential "identity vacuum" on the other-fundamentally ex-
56. Id. at 28.
57. Id. at 30-31.
58. Herberg's definition of the "American Way of Life" is very illuminating.
It should be clear that what is being designated under the American Way
of Life is not the so-called "common denominator" religion; it is not a synthetic
system composed of beliefs to be found in all or in a group of religions. It is an
organic structure of ideas, values, and beliefs that constitutes a faith common to
Americans and genuinely operative in their lives, a faith that markedly influ-
ences, and is influenced by, the "official" religions of American society.
If the American Way of Life had to be defined in one word, "democracy" would
undoubtedly be the word, but democracy in a peculiarly American sense. On its
political side it means Constitution; on its economic side, "free enterprise"; on
its social side, an equalitarianism which is not only compatible with but indeed
actually implies vigorous economic competition and high mobility. Spiritually,
the American Way of Life is best expressed in a certain kind of "idealism"
which has come to be recognized as characteristically American. It is a faith that
has its symbols and its rituals, its holidays and its liturgy, its saints and its
sancta; and it is a faith that every American, to the degree that he is an Ameri-
can, knows and understands.
The American Way of Life is individualistic, dynamic, pragmatic. It affirms the
supreme value and dignity of the individual; it stresses incessant activity on his
part, for he is never to rest but is always striving to "get ahead"; it defines an
ethic of self-reliance, merit, and character, and judges by achievement: "deeds,
not creeds" are what count. The American Way of Life is humanitarian, "for-
ward looking," optimistic .... The American believes in progress, in self-
improvement, and quite fanatically in education. But above all, the American is
idealistic. Americans cannot go on making money or achieving worldly success
simply on its own merits; such "materialistic" things must, in the American
mind, be justified in "higher" terms, in terms of "service" or "stewardship" or
"general welfare." Because Americans are so idealistic, they tend to confuse es-
pousing an ideal with fulfilling it and are always tempted to regard themselves
as good as the ideals they entertain: hence the amazingly high valuation most
Americans quite sincerely place on their own virtue. And because they are so
idealistic, Americans tend to be moralistic: they are inclined to see all issues as
plain and simple, black and white, issues of morality. Every struggle in which
they are seriously engaged becomes a "crusade."
Id. at 77-79.
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plains both the prevalence of intermarriage as well as its internal
discord.
To some, intermarriage represents the fulfillment of the Ameri-
can dream . . . . It is the ultimate embodiment of the melting
pot. To others, it represents the inevitable curse of equality; the
price that all minority groups must be willing to pay in the
coinage of their own valued traditions for living peaceably in a
free society. [For all] it constitutes an often delicate balancing of
the pulls and tugs of love and tradition; a balancing between the
loyalties to individuals and loyalties to ancestral memories; at-
tachments to the compelling present and affinities to a lingering
past . . . . [T]he heritages, traditions, cultural memories, and
group identities of individuals who fall in love and marry do
continue to play a significant role in the individuals' self-con-
cepts and also in the life-styles of their families.59
Intermarriage, therefore, "is inevitably a conversation about
culture, history, and the personal feelings about tradition,"60 a con-
versation which, unfortunately, usually does not take place until is-
sues of family identity become a source of conflict."1
What we have gleaned from our exegesis of intermarriage is
that throughout "our lives ethnicity is a powerful influence in deter-
mining our identity. By providing a sense of belonging and of histor-
ical continuity, it meets a basic psychological need." 62 Because
ethnicity "involves conscious and unconscious processes that fulfill"6 3
this need, it influences "our thinking, feeling, and behavior in both
obvious and subtle ways."64 It interacts with the life cycle to rein-
force our "cultural identity" and provides us "with the rituals, the
59. MAYER, supra note 13, at 8, 32.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Mayer elaborates on this point:
lilt is clear that the events or situations that necessitate negotiating matters
of family identity are primarily those having to do with the holiday cycles of the
calendar and certain transition points of the life cycle. As one pundit summed it
up years ago, we suddenly find religion or heritage important when we "hatch,"
"match," or "dispatch," as in birth, marriage, and death. Less glibly, the mat-
ters that necessitate negotiations over the issues of family identity among in-
termarriers are the wedding itself, how to raise children, what holidays to cele-
brate and how to celebrate them, and-to a lesser extent-how closely to
pattern the general life-style of the family on either of the couple's twin
heritages.
Id. at 180-81.
62. Monica MeGoldrick & Nydia Preto, Ethnic Intermarriage: Implications for Ther-
apy, 23 FAMILY PROCESS 347, 347 (1984).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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symbols, and the context of familiar meanings"6 that enable us to
deal positively with those moments when life reaches a crossroads. "
As our ethnicity calms the anxiety generated by the forces of change
with a coherent sense of meaning, we experience a rapprochement
with the nascent ideals that shape our world view.67 Intermarriage,
however, undermines the utility of ethnicity by creating "ethnic di-
lemmas" where any choice will result in offending at least one part-
ner's latent attachment to a particular religious heritage.66 Given the
potential for recurrent conflict between different ethnic identities,
how do these differences manifest themselves in the intermarrieds'
relationship, and from where do these conflicts originate?
As a general rule, "the greater the cultural difference between
the spouses, the more difficulty they will have understanding each
other and adjusting to marriage and the more difficulty their families
will have adjusting to the required changes." '69 More specifically,
several factors influence the degree of adjustment required of an in-
termarriage: (1) the "extent of difference in values between the cul-
tural groups involved," (2) differences "in the degree of acculturation
of each spouse," (3) religious differences, (4) racial differences, (5)
the sex roles as defined by each spouse's culture, (6) socioeconomic
differences, (7) "familiarity with each other's cultural context prior
to marriage," (8) "the degree of resolution of emotional issues about
the intermarriage reached by both families prior to the wedding," (9)
differing styles of emotional expression and communication born of
one's ethnicity, and (10) differing contextual views of the role the
family plays in each spouse's culture."
If intermarriage presents so many possible problems, why do
such marriages occur?
Generally, individuals who choose to marry out are seeking
a rebalance in the characteristics of their own ethnic back-
ground. They may be attempting to move away from certain
values and aspects of their cultural identity they dislike by mov-
ing toward others that they admire .... Those who marry out
may also be seeking to solve a family dilemma. They may be
attempting to detriangle from an intense emotional relationship
65. Id. at 348.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 347-48.
68. Id. at 348.
69. McGoldrick & Preto, supra note 62, at 348.
70. Id. at 349-50, 354-56.
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in the family of origin.'
Yet, as we have seen, the "dynamic of simultaneously wanting
intimacy and distance,"7 of balancing "love and tradition," '73 ex-
poses the limit of these traditional reasons for intermarriage. 4
Whether seeking balance, 'diversity, or escape, one's religious up-
bringing, though often suppressed during courtship and the initiation
of marriage, reappears almost reflexively at critical points in the life
cycle.75 We may thus conclude the following: Religion is a vital part
of one's personal identity, and in the case of interfaith marriages, it
is highly probable that these religious attachments will emerge upon
raising a family. The result is tension and conflict over the proper
manner and environment in which to raise children-discord which
becomes more virulent as the intact marriage begins to dissolve.
Before we can address the legal ramifications of these differences
upon marital dissolution, we must first understand precisely how re-
ligion serves to shape one's sense of self, and what, if any, harm
results if one is raised in two distinct and dissonant religious
traditions.
III. THE NATURE OF RELIGION
Describing the nature of religion is, without a guide star, a near
futile endeavor. Religion bridges the real and the surreal, the natural
and the supernatural, the man and the myth, the world that was and
the world that is to be; religion links man to his inner sense of self
and the world in which he interacts through some transcendent set of
beliefs. To fully understand the nature of religion, one must turn to
the social sciences-specifically, sociology, anthropology, and psy-
chology. 76 This section explores the manner in which each of these
fields views the impact of religion on the individual and society. A
synthesis of these perspectives, in the form of a scientific description
of religion, will assist.us in the structuring of a legal rule concerning
71. Id. at 350-51; see also BERMAN, supra note 24, at 516-46.
72. SUSAN SCHNEIDER, INTERMARRIAGE: THE CHALLENGE OF LIVING WITH DIFFER-
ENCES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 22 (1989).
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
74. McGoldrick & Preto, supra note 62, at 362.
75. Id. at 356.
76. Religion is obviously theological and philosophical as well. However, the scope of
our investigation concerns the effect of religion qua belief system on the temporal welfare of
the individual qua individual and qua member of society. Thus, this section will limit its
discussion to the social scientific explanations of the influences of religion on the individual, the
family, and society; liturgical analyses of religion are, under this narrow construction, beyond
the scope of this article.
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the religious welfare of a child who is the subject of a custody
proceeding.
A. The Sociological Perspective
Contemporary sociology conceives of religion as the develop-
ment, through social interaction, of a world view which thematically
rationalizes one's existence within society."' Further, not only is reli-
gion sustained by continued social interaction, but it also institution-
ally sustains a particular community's way of life. Indeed, religious
tenets will only retain adherents so long as they can be reaffirmed in
society." Yet, why does one need a world view? How does a world
view emanate from society and reinforce its institutions? The sociolo-
gist answers these questions by stressing the relationship between re-
ligion and the empowerment of the individual with a sense of self.
At its root, religion is a product of the individual's need to make
sense of the Absurd-that stark paradoxical reality of the human
condition that man is born replete with the gifts, intellect, and hubris
to conceive of immortality, and even to seek it out, only to recognize
that he is indeed condemned to die. To cope with the recurring fear
and anxiety which the Absurd arouses, the individual relies on the
tenets of a religion, a "system of beliefs and practices"-an ideology,
reinforced by ritual, which grounds the individual in a sense of se-
curity and membership in something beyond the corporeal self.'
Upon realizing the truths of a particular set of beliefs, individual
adherents begin to divide their world into the sacred and the profane;
between that which is holy and awesome, and that which is mun-
dane, commonplace, representative of the drone of everyday life.8"
77. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOLUME
Two-LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 48-54 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987).
78. Marie Cornwall, The Social Bases of Religion: A Study of Factors Influencing Re-
ligious Belief and Commitment, 29 REV. REL. RES. 44, 45 (1987).
79. Emile Durkheim wrote:
The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who
sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant, he is a man who is
stronger.
He feels within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or to
conquer them. It is as though he were raised above the miseries of the world,
because he is raised above his condition as a mere man; he believes that he is
saved from evil, under whatever form he may conceive this evil. The first article
in every creed is the belief in salvation by faith.
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 416 (Joseph Swain
trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1976) (1915).
80. The dominant "characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always suppose a
[Vol. 33
SOLOMONIC PARADOX
This demarcation between the spiritual and the material allows the
believer to create a reality which not only begins to reinforce the
precepts of the faith, but also provides a sense of order in the uni-
verse that quells the pangs of the Absurd. However, this new reality,
if only in the mind of one individual, would not be very convincing.
Religion, therefore, is a communal experience and "religious force is
nothing other than the collective and anonymous force of the
clan" 81-a collective conscience which, through mutual adherence
and reinforcement, serves to integrate the individual into the society
by providing a feeling of belonging, a sense of identity."2
Religion is more than an elixir for the existentially troubled.
Without doubt, religion gives the individual a sense of place in soci-
ety and a community "support group" to reinforce shared beliefs
when moments of crisis might lead the individual to question the
plausibility of those beliefs. But religion also provides an ethical ba-
sis for the underlying structure of a society, a system of values
which, by placing the state of one's current existence-complete with
its inequities and disappointments-into a broader conception of a
larger social whole, maximizes social stability and minimizes unrest.
Thus, in the sociological perspective, religion is a powerful force
both in the socialization of the individual and in the rationalization
of society. 3
bipartite division of the whole universe, known and knowable, into two classes which embrace
all that exists, but which radically exclude each other." Id. at 40.
Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane
things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at
a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the representations which express
the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with
each other or with profane things.
Id. at 40-41.
81. Id. at 221.
82. Durkheim eloquently summarized this point:
Thus the collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being due to a
vague innate power of the individual, but it is rather at the school of a collective
life that the individual has learned to idealize. It is in assimilating the ideals
elaborated by society that he has become capable of conceiving the ideal. It is
society which, by leading him within its sphere of action, has made him acquire
the need of raising himself above the world of experience and has at the same
time furnished him with the means of conceiving another. For society has con-
structed this new world in constructing itself, since it is society which this
expresses.
DURKHEIM, supra note 79, at 423.
83. Malinowski perhaps most succinctly described the sociological interpretation of reli-
gion: "Religion needs the community as a whole so that its members may worship in common
its sacred things and its divinities, and society needs religion for the maintenance of moral law
and order." Bronislaw Malinowski, The Public and the Individual Character of Religion,
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B. The Anthropological Perspective
The anthropologist begins with the same existential dilemma
which the sociologist and the theologian indicate as the question:
How does man cope with the reality of death and suffering? Unlike
the theologian, the anthropologist does not focus primarily on a litur-
gical response; unlike the sociologist, the anthropologist does not fo-
cus primarily on society. Rather, the anthropologist uses the scien-
tific method of the sociologist to examine how the theological
response affects the reactions of the individual to the question.
What the anthropologist discovers is that religion "assures the
victory of tradition and culture over the mere negative response of
thwarted instinct."84 Through the use of religious symbols, man is
able to communicate and make sense of the ineffable. "For those able
to embrace them .. .religious symbols provide a cosmic guarantee
not only for their ability to comprehend the world, but also, compre-
hending it, to give a precision to their feeling, a definition, to them,
emotions which enables [man,] morosely or joyfully, grimly or cava-
lierly, to endure it." ' As language and communication through sym-
bols are culturally created and shared phenomena, it seems ines-
capable that the anthropologist must explain religion as more than a
personal experience. Religious action is "the imbuing of a certain
specific complex of symbols-of the metaphysic they formulate and
the style of life they recommend-with a persuasive authority."8
Part of the persuasion is the theology itself; but another part is the
shared cultural experience." Thus, the anthropologist maintains the
primacy of religion as epiphenomenal to the individual, a guidepost
for coping with both everyday travails and moments of crisis. The
secondary public character of religion is credited with the intergener-
ational conduit of a community's culture, tradition, and heritage. For
the anthropologist, religion ultimately is an individually inspired,
Soc. & REL. 144 (Norman Birnbaum & Gertrude Lentzer eds., 1969).
84. Bronislaw Malinowski, Death and the Reintegration of the Group, RELIGION:
NORTH AMERICAN STYLE 33, 36 (Patrick H. McNamara ed., 2d ed., 1984).
85. Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in RELIGION: NORTH AMERICAN
STYLE 12, 13-14 (Patrick H. McNamara ed., 2d ed., 1984).
86. Geertz, supra note 85, at 16 (emphasis added).
87. Malinowski notes three reasons why religion has a collective, public component: (1)
"social cooperation is needed to surround the unveiling of things sacred and of supernatural
beings with solemn grandeur," (2) "public performance of religious dogma is indispensable for
the maintenance of morals" in the community, and (3) "the transmission and the conservation
of sacred tradition entails publicity, or at least collectiveness of performance." Malinowski,
supra note 84, at 151-52.
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culturally created system of meaning."8
C. The Psychological Perspective
Unlike the sociologist and anthropologist, the psychologist seeks
to explain the nature of religion exclusively through the individual.
Foremost in the psychologist's thought is whether religious belief has
any therapeutic value, or is in fact a neurotic condition. Though
early Freudian theory posited that religion was analogous to obses-
sive neuroses, and therefore merely a symptom of a deeper, underly-
ing problem,89 modern schools of psychology emphasize a positive
role for religion in the life of the devout. For the believer, religion
acts as an "ego strength" which helps shape and reinforce his indi-
vidual identity.9"
As the individual grows and develops, from infancy to maturity,
every life event becomes a challenge, and the response to the chal-
lenge contributes to that individual's self-identity. Without sufficient
ego strength, failure to rise to certain challenges over time can lead
to neurotic responses. But the cognitive psychologists have taught
that neuroses are learned phenomena, behavioral responses which
can be "unlearned" by reorienting the selfs relation to past chal-
lenges. 9 The reorientation takes the form of a new set of beliefs, and
88. Clifford Geertz expounds on the importance of meaning.
For an anthropologist, the importance of religion lies in its capacity to
serve, for an individual or a group, as a source of general, yet distinctive concep-
tions of the world, the self, and the relations between them, on the one
hand-its model of aspect-and of rooted, no less distinctive "mental" disposi-
tions-its model for aspect-on the other. From these cultural functions flow, in
turn, its social and psychological ones.
Religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to
provide a framework of general ideas in terms of which a wide range of experi-
ence-intellectual, emotional, moral-can be given meaningful form.
Geertz, supra note 85, at 17.
89. See 9 SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 117-127 (Basic Books ed., 1959).
90. According to Erik Erikson:
[Religion] elaborates on what feels profoundly true even though it is not demon-
strable; it translates into significant words, images, and codes the exceeding
darkness which surrounds man's existence, and the light which pervades it be-
yond all desert or comprehension. Religion . . . is primarily a source of ideolo-
gies for those who seek identities . . . . [Ideology means] an unconscious ten-
dency underlying religious . . . thought: the tendency at a given time to make
facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image
convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity.
Erik Erikson, Religion and the Crisis of Identity, in SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION. 176 (Nor-
man Birnbaum and Gertrude Lenzer eds., 1969).
91. See, e.g., AARON T. BECK ET AL., COGNITIVE THERAPY OF DEPRESSION (1979);
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once enmeshed in the personality, becomes an ego strength. But reli-
gion is a set of beliefs oriented specifically toward answering many
of the challenges we encounter through life. Hence, for those with
firm religious beliefs, "there can be no objection to making use of the
therapeutic effect of his religious convictions and thereby drawing
upon his own spiritual resources."92
Religion has value for the psychologist because through devo-
tion the believer develops self-efficacy. Religion provides a set of be-
liefs which can focus an individual believer keenly on the meaning in
his life. Religious adherence can cognitively restructure one's subjec-
tive reality construct to empower one to struggle successfully, and
with purpose, against the pitfalls in life-be they physical or existen-
tial. Finding the right connection between meaning and identity is
the key to living well, and a deep religious faith is often one of the
best resources for the self-discovery that is not only enlightenment,
but survival.
D. Synthesis
What have we learned from examining social scientific perspec-
tives on the nature of religion? From the sociologist we have found
that religion is not only a powerful force in the socialization of the
individual, but also one of the components of a societal ethic which
contributes both to the cohesiveness and evolution of a community.
From the anthropologist we discovered that religion serves as a cul-
tural system of meaning, communicating through a particular set of
symbols, rites, and traditions a method of grasping a sense of the
ineffable. From the psychologist we learned that religion is not only
socially integrating and culturally reinforcing, but also is an ego
strength which can contribute to identity formation and provide a
blueprint for mental wellness.
Pulling these perspectives together, we can create a synthesis
which explains the nature of religion in three dimensions: (1) be-
tween the individual and society; (2) between the individual and cul-
ture; and (3) between the individual and self-efficacy. Our social sci-
entific inquiry presents the following definition of religion: Religion
is essentially a socio-cultural phenomenon which seeks, through a
unified symbolic belief system, to bring a sense of personal meaning
into those elements of the life cycle which seem ineffable. As man is
ALBERT Ei.us, REASON AND EMOTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1962).
92. VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 141-42 (Ilse Lasch trans., Part
1, 4th ed., Beacon Press 1992) (1959).
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ultimately a creature of society, religion not only relies on commu-
nity to enhance and reaffirm the effervescence of faith, but is also a
factor which contributes to the social integration and psychological
stability of the individual believer.93
E. Empirical Perspectives on the Nature of Religion
Recognizing the multiple benefits with which the above theoret-
ical perspectives credit religion, we must now seek empirical verifica-
tion. Is it true that religion increases socialization and self-efficacy?
Are culture and ethnicity critical to individual and group identity?
Are these values transmitted from parent to child? And, perhaps
most importantly, is reliance upon a unitary system of faith prefera-
ble to absorption simultaneously in multiple religions?
The most general empirical verification of the impact of religion
reveals that, not surprisingly, religious socialization, both within the
family and the somewhat broader congregational community, has a
positive influence on the level of one's religiosity, both in belief and
practice.94 As one would expect, if one is raised in a religious envi-
ronment, one will integrate these world views into one's personal
identity, and this aspect of the self is reinforced through the network
of significant others, peers, and clergy with whom one forms rela-
tionships within one's congregation. Indeed, several studies have
found that the intensity of one's participation in the religious com-
munity is positively correlated with various measures of psychologi-
cal well-being.95 Two more recent studies have expanded upon these
93. Herberg eloquently captured this multi-faceted essence of religion in modernity:
Confronted with the depersonalizing pressures of contemporary life, mod-
ern man experiences a profound exigency to preserve some remnant of personal-
ity and inwardness against the erosions of a mass culture. Increasingly, he turns
to religion to provide him an inexpugnable citadel for the self in a world in
which personal authenticity is threatened on every side; indeed, the quest for
authenticity is itself substantially a religious quest. Reflecting, as it does, the
crisis of our time, it also points to its deeper meaning. For ultimately, the crisis
of our time is a crisis of faith .... At its deepest level, the turn to religion...
owes much of its force to the search for a new and more viable "philosophy" of
existence amid the spiritual chaos of our age.
Herberg, supra note 55, at 62-64.
94. Cornwall, supra note 78, at 44.
95. GERALD GURIN ET AL., AMERICANS VIEW THEIR MENTAL HEALTH (1960)(find-
ing church attendance to be positively related to job and marital happiness, lack of distress and
worry, positive self-concept and general happiness); RICHARD V. MCCANN, THE CHURCH.S
AND MENTAL HEALTH (1962)(church attendance positively related to general happiness or
life satisfaction); Elmer Spreitzer & Eldon E. Snyder, Correlates of Life Satisfaction Among
the Aged, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 454 (1974) (finding church attendance to be a factor in life
satisfaction among the aged); Frank Clemente & William J. Sauer, Life Satisfaction in the
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correlates. Robert Witter, besides noting the positive relation be-
tween religion and subjective well-being, reports specifically that re-
ligious activity is more strongly related to subjective well-being than
religiosity. This distinction means that the presence of a persistent
religious network or community, more than feelings of spirituality,
contribute to the development of ego strengths.9 Larry Petersen and
Anita Roy97 conclude that religious salience, "the extent to which
one's religious faith is a central or ultimate component of his/her
life," positively relates to "meaning and purpose," which "refers to
the extent to which the individual perceives that he/she leads a
worthwhile, goal-oriented, or meaningful existence."98 Further, reli-
gious participation negatively correlates with anxiety, or "the mental
distress in which the individual is apprehensive that the conditions or
circumstances of his/her life will result in ill-consequences." 99 From
an empirical standpoint, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude
that religious salience, manifest primarily through participation in a
religious community, is a positive-affective influence on self-efficacy
and subjective well-being.
Recognizing that religious socialization has positive psychologi-
cal benefits, one wonders if these benefits are transmitted intergener-
ationally, from parent to child. There are two divergent theoretical
responses. The first, social learning theory, asserts that "through ob-
servation of our social world, through cognitive interpretation of that
world, and through reinforcements or punishments of our responses
in that world, attitudes and behaviors are learned and are carried
through into adulthood," with the parent as the primary "transmit-
ter." 100 Under this interpretation, moral development occurs by the
United States, 54 Soc. FORCES 621 (1976) (finding direct relationship between social partici-
pation and life satisfaction); Christopher K. Hadaway & Wade C. Roof, Religious Commit-
ment and the Quality of Life in America, 19 REV. REL. REs. 295, 299 (1978)(importance of
faith to one's life; church membership and attendance are positively related to value of life);
Robert S. Sturgeon & Roy W. Hamley, Religiosity and Anxiety, 108 J. Soc. PsycH. 137
(1979)(people with intrinsic religious orientation experienced less existential and trait anxiety
and had greater internal locus of control than did extrinsically oriented individuals); Mark
Baker & Richard Gorsuch, Trait Anxiety and Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religiousness, 21 J. Scl.
STUD. REL. 119 (1982)(anxiety positively related to extrinsic religiosity and negatively related
to intrinsic religiosity).
96. Robert A. Witter et al., Religion and Subjective Well-Being in Adulthood: A
Quantitative Synthesis, 26 REV. REL. RES. 332, 335-37 (1985).
97. Larry R. Petersen & Anita Roy, Religiosity, Anxiety, and Meaning and Purpose:
Religion's Consequences for Psychological Well-Being, 27 REV. REL. RES. 49, 51 (1985).
98. Id. at 50.
99. Id.
100. Roger L. Dudley & Margaret G. Dudley, Transmission of Religious Values from
Parents to Adolescents, 28 REV. REL. RF.s. 3 (1986).
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child internalizing the moral (which includes religious) standards of
the parent.' 0' In contrast, emancipation theory posits that children
are likely to reject parental values and seek out through other circles
an alternate set of beliefs to serve as the child's "statement of inde-
pendence" from the parents. Under this theory, little of the moral
values of the parent will be transferred to the child.10 2 Though the
common notion of the "generation gap" gives credence to emancipa-
tion theory, in the area of religious value transmission, research sup-
ports the general thesis of social learning theory. Roger and Mar-
garet Dudley have found that children resemble the religious values
of their parents, and in the case of parental disagreement over a reli-
gious issue, it is most likely that the child will identify with the fa-
ther.' 0 3 In a more detailed study, Dianne Kiernen and Brenda
Munro observed the following: (1) adolescent religious activity is
positively related to both the father's congregational activity and the
mother's perception of the acceptability of the family's religious
life;104 (2) for the male adolescent, both the paternal and maternal
rates of congregational activity are positively correlated to the child's
religious activity; 0 5 (3) the female adolescent views religious activity
as a coping mechanism and the intensity of this response is positively
correlated with the father's congregational activity;'0 6 and (4) if both
parents interact with the religious system, this has more of a positive
impact than if only one parent participates."' This last observation
is most revealing, for it would seem to suggest that, for interfaith
couples, raising the child actively in one faith with the participation
of both parents is preferable to either exposure to multiple religions,
participation in one faith with only one parent, or avoiding the reli-
gious issue entirely.'08 Is there any empirical support, culled from
research on intermarried families, to support this hypothesis?
Children of intermarriage may be raised in one of three reli-
gious environments: A single faith, a composite faith, or no religion
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 4-5.
103. Id. at 12-13.
104. Diane K. Kiernen & Brenda Munro, Following the Leaders: Parents' Influence
on Adolescent Religious Activity, 26 J. Sci. STUD. OF REL. 249, 251-52 (1987).
105. Id. at 252.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 255.
108. Typically this occurs in intermarriage when one spouse converts to the religion of
the other spouse. The evidence shows a marked increase in religious salience and identity
when the Gentile spouse converts and the child is raised in an exclusively Jewish household.
See MAYER, supra note 13, at-253; Ellman, supra note 13, at 12-13.
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at all. Sociologists and psychologists who have studied children of
exogamous marriages agree on two points: (1) children of couples
who choose to actively create a single religious environment suffer
the least amount of distress over issues of religious identity; and (2)
children who are raised in families with no religion because the par-
ents do not wish to address the issue suffer the most emotional dis-
tortion as a result of religion."0 9 The one issue that seems to be tim-
idly overlooked is the shared, or composite, faith-some argue it
causes nothing but confusion and is a detriment to self-efficacy, 1
while others believe that open and positive involvement with each
parent's faith helps ground the child with a sense of belonging in
two cultures.111 But even those who defend "mixed religion" qualify
its utility, noting it only works for some families with distinct fea-
tures. '2 Further, given other variables such as resentment from both
109. SCHNEIDER, supra note 72, at 159-60 (1989); MAYER, supra note 13, at 261-77;
JUDY PESTSONK & JACK REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOK 177-211 (1988);
STEVEN REUBEN, BUT How WILL You RAISE THE CHILDREN? 188-92 (1987).
110. The following response from a child of intermarriage is indicative of this identity
confusion:
All my life I've been aware of being half and half. I feel like I'm on the
fringes of things in a lot of ways. I'm half Jewish, half Christian. I was raised a
political radical, but I don't have any politics. I don't have any geographic roots.
I just feel there are a whole lot of ways I don't belong. I've wanted to know who
I was ever since I was a teenager.
PAUL COWAN & RACHEL COWAN, MIXED BLESSINGS: MARRIAGE BETWEEN JEWS AND
CHRISTIANS 246 (1987). The following admonishment from a teenager of an exogamous mar-
riage represents the "caught in the middle" phenomenon, where religion is not a sense of
identity, but one commodity with which parents will curry favor with the children.
You can't be both. You're neither and stuck and don't really know who you
are. You are afraid if you say you are one or the other religion that you will
offend someone, so you figure out ways to avoid the subject and not get into
situations where you'll have to answer questions at all.
REUBEN, supra note 109, at 204.
Many children of intermarriage face one of these two forms of cognitive dissonance, dual
loyalty or disassociation, and when asked to advise their parents, the conventional wisdom from
the "mouths of babes" is: "Choose which religion you want and stick with it. It doesn't matter
which one you choose, but choose one. It makes it a lot easier on the kid." Id. at 209.
111. See PESTSONK & REMSEN, supra note 109, at 193-211. Some children find this a
plus, simply because it removes the pressure of religion as loyalty to one parent over another,
and even encourages the experimentation with different spiritual patterns.
I'm both, [Lori] declares without a hint of regret. "Lots of my friends are
the same way, so it seems natural for me to be this way too. I think I have it
good with both religions, and I feel more involved with both. I'm free to choose
any religion, so I feel like I have a lot of freedom in my life. I see it as a positive
thing for me growing up this way as a child. Now that I am fourteen, I can
honestly look back at my childhood and say it was a positive experience for me.
REUBEN, supra note 109, at 201.
112. See PESTSONK & REMSEN, supra note 109, at 178-81; Reuben, supra note 109, at
188-99.
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of the extended families and latent feelings of ethnicity and tradition
within the interfaith parents," 3 these quiet endorsements seem to
turn into nothing more than an admission that because the "mixed"
option is in reality exercised, rather than condemn it, social scientists
should offer qualified strategies for those families which try make
this composite work.
In the end, our ultimate concern is with the children and creat-
ing a religious environment which contributes to, and not detracts
from, developing a positive self-identity. Each of the various alterna-
tive religious settings has its success stories. But from both a theoreti-
cal and empirical standpoint, it seems that the most consistent thread
throughout is that a unitary religious environment, with both parents
actively involved in its development, is the only alternative that has a
persistent therapeutic effect on the child's subjective well-being. 4
113. See MAYER, supra note 13, at 144-55. This is a critical factor when considering
the welfare of the child. For even when couples are open about their differences, if a sense of
loss of one's heritage, of alienating one's family, remains, this latent stir of a set of emotions
becomes a time bomb that will explode when other aspects of the marriage are less stable.
Also, one must remember that the lure of exogamy is a weakening of the attachment to tradi-
tion, so that when feelings of tradition reappear at life cycle events, these parents will not be as
well equipped to handle their feelings because of their religious illiteracy-they will be drawn
back to the fold without knowing why, and this inability to explain will be interpreted as some
form of hostility by the other spouse and the children. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests
it is the rare case that an interfaith couple and their extended families are able to nurture
positively an open and composite religious integration for their children.
114. Susan Schneider aptly summarizes what seem to be the dominant themes from the
perspective of the children of interfaith marriages:
Children of intermarriage will probably always carry something of both
religious traditions as part of their family associations. But all children, espe-
cially while they are young, probably need a unified religious identity, not, "My
mother is this, my father is that and I'm half and half." In a perfect world, it
might be possible for children to sort out that certain observances and holidays
come from one parent or the other, but one of the ways children-especially in
the years before adolescence-sort out their reality is by naming it and by cross-
examining others. To the question: "What religion are you?" it is certainly
convenient and reassuring-if not strictly necessary-to have a simple answer
rather than having to "explain" one's family bifurcation, however rich in op-
tions this might seem to one's parents.
Raised with both religions, understanding that the parents' lives are a
blend of sometimes disparate religions, most children in this situation will, how-
ever, ultimately choose one religion or the other as the primary one with which
to identify.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 72, at 159-60. Paul and Rachel Cowan express similar sentiment:
[Children of intermarriage whom we studied] valued clarity and a sense of
security. They felt parents should choose a religious identity for their children
and not leave it up to them to choose. Furthermore, they thought parents should
furnish an environment in which the children would feel comfortable living with
that identity.
They wanted roots in one of their parents' religions and cultures, but
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IV. RELIGION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE INTERFAITH MARRIAGE
Having discovered our ideal type of religious environment for
the child of an interfaith marriage, we now must confront the pain-
ful reality that many children will not have both parents participat-
ing in their religious upbringing, or even agreeing upon a spiritual
path. We must face the impact divorce has, not only in general on
the emotional stability of the child, but also specifically on how reli-
gion becomes a weapon in custody decisions. Using what knowledge
social science has already given us about the empowering aspects of
religion, we must transform "spiritual custody" from a feared addi-
tion to an already emotionally-laden conflict, to a means of enhanc-
ing the child's temporal well-being upon dissolution of the family.
A. Religion, Divorce and Intermarriage
Divorce stands out as one of the most traumatic events a person
can encounter within the course of a lifetime. The collapse of the
marital bond combines the practical-the need for separation and
new direction and the economic realities associated with that
shift-with the emotional-the great feelings of loss, anger, resent-
ment, guilt-with the surreal-the strange sensation that arises as
the coldly rational process of dissolution begins to coalesce with the
belief that this is all one bad dream, the feeling that "this can't be
happening." And the process will produce the greatest trauma of
all-the sudden realignment of a child's world. Though ideally the
time between separation and dissolution allows for transition and ad-
justment, often it becomes marked by bitter tumult.. Spouses fight to
retain aspects of the past, and children begin to become commodities,
pawns in a sadistic game. And the greatest irony of all occurs when
religion, that great resource of meaning and purpose, spirituality and
wholeness, is used as a stratagem in structuring the post-marital
arrangement.
What happens to children when their religious identity is
reified as an element in a divorce proceeding?
Children in interfaith divorces are subject to a potentially
confusing assortment of religious decisions and choices. They
often feel (or are made to feel) that they must choose sides, not
only between Mommy and Daddy, but between one religion
branches that extended to the other's.
COWAN & COWAN, supra note 110, at 247.
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and the other. It is particularly cruel to force such decisions and
feelings upon innocent children, and it has the potential of turn-
ing them against any religion whatsoever in the future. 1 '
How do children respond in such situations?
Even small children know what is going on and understand
much more of what you say and mean than most people give
them credit for. "It was awful," Kris, aged six, said about his
parents' divorce. "They used to yell a lot, and Daddy would say
bad things about Christians to Mommy. I was scared that he
would yell at me too if I said I wanted to see my friends at
church."
Kris, who up to age six had been "raised as both Jewish
and Christian" by his parents, began to feel great anxiety any-
time Christianity or church was mentioned during the time of
his parents' divorce. He was afraid he would lose his father's
love if he showed any interest in the friends he had met at
church, and was torn by his need for the protection and love of
both his parents, who seemed to demand his loyalty to different
religions at the same time. 16
In most relationships, "religion alone is rarely the cause of a
breakup or divorce."1 1 Instead, religion tends to be "a smokescreen
masking other issues."1 Rabbi Steven Reuben, an experienced
counselor, has argued that religious issues are "usually only symbolic
representations of the underlying problems and differences that drive
relationships apart, and become a useful scapegoat for the frustra-
tion, anger, disappointment, and sense of failure that inevitably ac-
company the dissolution of a relationship." 9 Unfortunately, these
latent issues usually get played out through the divorce, in several
detrimental ways. First, one spouse may use religion to undermine
the other spouse's relationship with the children. "In this scenario,
both parents are now openly practicing separate religions, and they
lock horns over the question of 'double exposure' to the two
faiths."12 In the process, the parents fail to realize that "since the
child identifies with both parents, criticism of the religion-and by
implication the values and personality-of either parent also under-
115. REUBEN, supra note 109, at 228.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. PESTSONK & REMSEN, supra note 109, at 297.
119. REUBEN, supra note 109, at 228-29.
120. PESTSONK & REMSEN, supra note 109, at 300.
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mines the child's own confidence and self-esteem."12 Second, a par-
ent may "hoard" custody under the pretext of religious practice and
education, but in reality may only want to reduce the other parent's
time with the child.122 Third, sometimes a spouse who converted to
the other spouse's religion for the welfare of the children may, upon
divorce, revert to the original faith, and in the process, seek to take
the children as well. 23
All of these mechanisms for control, regardless of the psycholog-
ical manifestations behind them, serve only to injure the child by
undermining the identity that the religion supplied during the mar-
riage. Hence, the predominant advice of therapists to parents in
these situations emphasizes placing the welfare of the child first. Be-
cause of the importance of religious continuity to identity, especially
at a young age, whatever the custody arrangement, both parents
should continue to encourage the same religious environment unless
the child, upon mature reflection, decides to make a change.1
25
Our research of the social science literature suggests the follow-
ing conventional rule concerning the creation of a child's religious
environment: As religion has a positive impact upon a child's self-
identity and socialization, and as a single religious environment nur..
tured by both parents offers the most efficacious alternative in an
interfaith marriage, parents in an exogamous marriage should de-
cide before the birth of a child in what faith they will rear that
child, and from the child's first breath should share in the develop-
ment of that religious choice and perpetuate this spiritual growth
even upon divorce.'26 Would our jurisprudence support such a rule?
To answer this question we must first understand upon what stan-
dard the law decides the issue of child custody.
B. The Best Interests Standard in Child Custody
Until recently, courts would not award custody principally by
considering what would be in the "best interests" of the child, but
instead by relying on presumptions rooted in sex-based role stereo-
121. d.
122. Id. at 300-01.
123. Id. at 301-02.
124. PES'rSONK & REMSEN, supra note 109, at 302.
125. Id. at 302-03.
126. From the social science point of view, obviously this rule is most efficacious from
birth. But the state action doctrine prohibits enforcement of this rule until dissolution of the
marriage brings the issue before a court. Realistically, all the law can be expected to do is to
facilitate the best interests of the child after the intermarriage dissolves. Hence, this rule has no
legal impact upon intact families, for there exists no state action.
[Vol. 33
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types. The common law presumed the father to be the "natural
guardian of the child" as the result of a patriarchal society that
viewed the married woman not as an individual but an appendage of
her husband. 127 In the late nineteenth century, a change occurred,
with the presumption shifting in favor of maternal custody based on
the "tender years" doctrine-the belief that children, usually under
the age of eight, would, because of their young age, have needs that
only a mother could nurture. 2 8 Within the last twenty years, as a
result of both the women's movement and developments in child psy-
chology,' 29 courts have shifted to a new standard, "the best interests
of the child," that instructs judges to make custody decisions not on
the basis of stereotypes but by determining which parent will better
serve the welfare of the child.
Because the "best interests of the child," without more, has
emerged as an amorphous, highly subjective and even arbitrary stan-
dard,130 many states have enacted statutes listing a specific set of fac-
tors that a judge must consider in making a custody award. Section
402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (hereinafter UMDA)
illustrates the core factors in such statutes:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
127. Jay Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing So-
cial Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-American Law, 4 BEHAV. ScI. & L.
119, 120-23 (1986).
At common law, it was the father rather than the mother who held a vir-
tual absolute right to the custody of their minor children. This rule of law was
fostered, in part, by feudalistic notions concerning the "natural" responsibilities
of the husband at common law. The husband was considered the head or master
of his family, and, as such, responsible for the care, maintenance, education and
religious training of his children . . . . By contrast, the wife was without any
rights to the care and custody of her minor children. By marriage, husband and
wife became one person with the legal identity of the woman being totally
merged with that of her husband.
Ex Parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688 (Ala. 1981).
128. See Einhorn, supra note 128, at 128-30.
129. Professor Beschle aptly describes this phenomenon:
Over the last two decades, the women's movement has made great strides in
establishing the principle that the presence of individual talents and qualities
should be measured directly, rather than assumed on the basis of gender. In
short, society and in particular the law should rely on specific facts rather than
stereotypes. At the same time, a proliferation of writing in psychology and the
social sciences has attempted to isolate specific characteristics conducive to suc-
cessful child rearing and to debunk the notion that these are the inevitable, gen-
der-based attributes of maternal love.
Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody
and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 386-87 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
130. See Mnookin, supra note 3, at 978; Elster, supra note 3, at 11-16.
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best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant
factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and commu-
nity; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.31
Only six states have specifically included the religious environ-
ment of the child as a factor to be considered in the best interests
calculus.1"2 The majority of states, and the UMDA, view religion as
a component of the temporal well-being of the child, which the judge
need not specifically consider in arriving at a custody decision. 3'
Though presented with a seemingly endless number of factors to
consider in reaching a decision, a court has a very limited number of
custody options. A parent may be awarded physical and/or legal
custody,"3 either to be shared with the other parent jointly or to be
131. UNIF. MARR. & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
132. Each of these states varies in phrasing the consideration of the religious environ-
ment. Alaska provides that "in determining the best interest of the child the court shall con-
sider the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child." ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150(c)(1) (1991) (emphasis added). Hawaii weights the religious factor somewhat
less, stating simply that "the court may hear the testimony of any person or expert ... relevant
to a just and reasonable determination of what is for the best physical, mental, moral, and
spiritual well-being of the child ...." HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1991) (emphasis added).
In contrast, Michigan is quite specific in the consideration of religion: " 'Best interests of the
child' means the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated and determined
by the court .. . .[Tihe capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion
or creed, if any." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23(b) (1991). Similarly, Minnesota provides that
"'the best interests of the child' means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by
the court including ...[10] the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture
and religion or creed, if any." MINN. STAT. § 518.17(10) (1991). South Carolina's statute is
perhaps the most unusual, stating that the "court may ... make such orders touching the care,
custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage and what, if any, security shall be
given for the same as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case and the
best spiritual as well as other interests of the children may be fit, equitable and just." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law Co-op 1991) (emphasis added). Finally, Wisconsin simply di-
rects the court to consider as one factor "[tihe child's adjustment to the home, school, religion
and community." Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(d) (1991).
133. See Beschle, supra note 129, at 386-87.
134. Physical custody contemplates "residence with [or] under the care and supervision
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exercised alone. Given that a court could restrict the ability of one
parent to participate in decisions concerning the child's upbringing,
and could even eliminate physical contact with the child, the role of
the above factors in awarding custody is heightened.
Recognizing the serious ramifications of such a decision, a judge
will look for guidance in the various elements the legislature deems
mandatory to consider. But when consulting these factors, how
should the judge weigh one in comparison to the others? Are they all
of equal weight or is one more important, such as the ability to pro-
vide for the child's material needs, or the amount of time and love
one has to give to the child? Or are the child's wishes paramount?
And how should religious environment be factored into the balance?
Is joint, or shared, custody a useful option, and if so, when and how
should it be exercised? Even with model parents, answering these
questions seems nearly impossible,13 and because of this, the "best
interests" standard has received much criticism. 36
In their landmark book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit sought to docu-
ment the psychological effects the trauma of divorce has upon a
child. The authors note at the outset that "[c]ontinuity of relation-
ships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a
child's normal development."' 37 One can upset this continuity of care
between a child and his "psychological parent"-the individual who
"on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companion-
ship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs
for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs."' 38 As a result, the
critical stages of development for all mental processes are dis-
rupted.' 39 Believing that the "best interests of the child" inade-
of one or more persons." Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(2) (1991). Legal custody includes "the
decision-making rights, responsibilities, and authority relating to the health, education and
welfare of the child .... Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(1) (1991).
135. In Robert Mnookin's words, "Deciding what is best for the child poses a question
no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself .... [Wlhere is the judge to look for
the set of values that should inform the choice of what is best ... ?" Robert Mnookin, Child
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 226, 260 (1975).
136. See David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 480-85 (1984).
137. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-32
(1973).
138. Id. at 98.
139. "Disruption of continuity" takes different forms varying on the age of the child.
"In infancy, from birth to approximately 18 months, any change in routine leads. to food
refusals, digestive upsets, sleeping difficulties, and crying . . . Such moves from the familiar to
the unfamiliar cause discomfort, distress, and delays in the infant's orientation and adaptation
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quately accounts for the primacy of the continuity of care, Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit propose another approach. The "least detrimental
available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and develop-
ment,"4" is as follows:
[T]hat child placement and procedure for child placement which
maximizes, in accord with [the urgency of a child's instinctual
and emotional needs,] the child's opportunity for being wanted
and for maintaining on a continuous, unconditional, and perma-
nent basis, a relationship with at least one adult who is or will
become the child's psychological parent. 4
The rationale for a presumption in favor of awarding custody to
the "psychological parent," or "primary caregiver,''14 is quite simi-
within his surroundings." Id. at 32. "For infants and toddlers, lack of continuity causes "sep-
aration distress and anxiety" and "setbacks in the quality of ... attachments" to significant
others, leading to "increasingly shallow and indiscriminate" emotional attachments. Id. at 32-
33. For young children under the age of 5 "disruption of continuity also affects those achieve-
ments which are rooted and develop in the intimate interchange with a stable parent figure,
who is in the process of becoming a psychological parent." Id. at 33. "For school-age children,
the breaks in their relationships with their psychological parents affect above all those achieve-
ments which are based on identification with the parents' demands, prohibitions, and social
ideals." Id. For adolescents, "their behavior may convey the idea that what they desire is
discontinuation of parental relationships rather than their preservation and stability," which
reinforces a sense of "abandonment or rejection on the psychological parent's part." Id. at 34.
140. Id. at 99.
141. Id. In proposing this alternative, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in no way look with
disfavor upon the general perspective of the "best interests of the child."
Even though we agree with the manifest purpose of the "in-the-best-inter-
ests-of-the-child" standard, we adopt a new guideline for several reasons. First,
the traditional standard does not, as does the phrase "least detrimental," convey
to the decision maker that the child in question is already a victim of his envi-
ronmental circumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy action is
necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy psychologi-
cal development. Secondly, the old guideline, in context and as construed by
legislature, administrative agency, and court, has come to mean something less
than what is in the child's best interests. The child's interests are often balanced
against and frequently made subordinate to adult interests and rights. More-
over, and less forthrightly, many decisions are "in-name-only" for the best in-
terests of the specific child who is being placed. They are fashioned primarily to
meet the needs and wishes of competing adult claimants or to protect the general
policies of a child care or other administrative agency. But, even if the child's
rights were, in fact and iolicy, determinative and thus unequivocally superior to
adult interests, the guideline would remain inadequate.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
142. This article uses the term primary caregiver as a synonym for "psychological par-
ent." The former term should not be confused with the term "primary caretaker," used in
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-64 (W. Va. 1981). The terms have different connota-
tions. A court uses a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker intending to eliminate the
prospect of unfair bargaining in the process of separation, while a court using a presumption
in favor of the psychological parent seeks to insure continuity of care.
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lar to our rule favoring a "spiritual caregiver." Both place para-
mount importance on the "best interests of the child," which rests on
the premise that stability and continuity are essential for healthy so-
cial integration and the nurturing of feelings of -self-efficacy. Both
suggest that the decision maker in a custody proceeding operate with
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the parent most closely associ-
ated with the needs of the child-the "primary caregiver" for physi-
cal and temporal well-being, the "spiritual caregiver" for religious
needs. However, before a rule favoring the "spiritual" parent can
share the limelight with the "psychological" parent, we must resolve
the apparent conflict between "religious best interests" and various
provisions of the Constitution.
C. Spiritual Custody and the Constitution
In order to link the most efficacious dissolution, from the social
scientific point of view, of the exogamous marriage with the legal
rules that delimit the set of alternative forms of resolution available
to the decision maker, recall the saga of Pamela and David, an inter-
faith couple who, upon divorce, differ vehemently over the future
religious upbringing of their children."' 3 Pamela is Jewish, David is
a Roman Catholic, and all three children have been raised as Jews
with no exposure to any other religion, including David's Catholi-
cism. Upon divorce, however, David wishes to expose his children to
his own Catholic practices, and Pamela objects, believing that since
the children are Jewish, "double exposure" would be detrimental.
How do we resolve this conflict?
Under the UMDA, the legal custodian is entitled to make all
decisions concerning the child's religious upbringing.""' If the legal
custodian is also, in accordance with our terminology, the "spiritual
caregiver," no conflict exists. However, if legal and spiritual custo-
dian are not one and the same, or if legal custody is shared, the
conflict remains. Under the UMDA, the only way in which the spir-
itual custodian could obtain legal control over the child's religious
143. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
144. Section 408 of the UMDA provides that:
[E]xcept as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the time of the custody
decree, the custodian may determine the child's upbringing, including his educa-
tion, health care, and religious training, unless the court after hearing, find,
upon motion by the custodial parent, that in the absence of a specific limitation
of the custodian's authority, the child's physical health would be endangered or
his emotional development significantly impaired.
UNiF. MARR. & DIVORCE ACT § 408, 9A U.L.A. 627 (1987).
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upbringing is to prove to a court that to decide otherwise would
"'endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair his
emotional development'-a standard patently more onerous than the
'best interest' test.' 45 Thus, those states adopting the UMDA's ap-
proach would impose a heavy burden upon the "spiritual caregiver"
to gain legal control over the child's religious environment, and even
if this burden could be met, it would exact an incredible cost upon
all family members involved. The UMDA does not provide an ade-
quate answer to our problem.
A similar dilemma is encountered when using the "least detri-
mental alternative" advocated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who
vest control over religious training in the "psychological parent" or
"primary caregiver." When the primary caregiver is not also the
spiritual caregiver, the "least detrimental alternative" yields the
same result as the UMDA-egal rights for the spiritual caregiver
would only vest upon a showing of a likelihood of significant harm
resulting from allowing the primary caregiver to guide the religious
training of the child. 14' As imposing such a burden upon the spiri-
tual caregiver is patently unfair and in no way furthers the overall
well-being of the child, the "least detrimental alternative" is also an
inadequate response to this issue.' 47
Since very few states have adopted either the UMDA or the
"least detrimental alternative" approach, it is important to see how
the majority of state courts resolve such conflicts concerning control
over a child's religious environment. "There is consensus among
courts that 'moral' factors are proper considerations, and many
courts also have explicitly endorsed consideration of the child's 'spiri-
tual' welfare.' 1 48 However, there is not such a consensus as to what
145. UNIF. MARR. & DIVORCE ACr § 408 comment, 9A U.L.A. 627 (1987).
146. GOLDSTFIN FT AL., supra note 137, at 100.
147. This article's approach to spiritual custody and the "least detrimental alternative"
advanced by Goldstein share the belief that a simple legal rule ensuring continuity of care
maximally promotes the best interests of the child. However, the two positions differ on the
harm such a rule is designed to avoid. Goldstein argues that vesting legal custody in the "psy-
chological parent" assures not only continuity but also optimizes parental autonomy free from
judicial interference-which means that one parent should retain the authority to make deci-
sions concerning the child's physical, temporal, and spiritual well-being. This article argues
that any sacrifice of some of the scope of the psychological parent's authority, by a judicial
award of spiritual custody, is outweighed by the benefit to the child in the continuous develop-
ment of a single religious identity. Thus, though both this article and Goldstein agree upon the
primacy of the best interests of the child, the two differ on how much judicial interference is
necessary to attain this goal.
148. Besehle, supra note 129, at 397. For example, in Burnham v. Burnham, 304
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1981), the court stated it would consider "the spiritual and temporal
welfare" of the child along with other factors. For an exhaustive list of cases, see Annotation,
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extent religion may be a factor in selecting a custodian. Some states
believe that religion simply may not be the sole or dominant factor in
the determination.149 Others prefer "the more substantial limitation
that religion may be considered only to the extent that it will have a
clear bearing on the secular well-being of the child."' 50 This re-
quires an affirmative showing that "religion or its absence will cause
physical, emotional or social benefits or harm to the child.' 51 With
such a subjective and indeterminate standard, the role of religion in
custody decisions will range from the belief that a court lacks the
power "to conclude that providing a religious environment is per se
beneficial to a child's welfare, '"52 to the view that "[r]eligion and
morality are so closely interwoven in the lives of most people that it
is difficult to say whether good moral character could be molded
[into] a child without some religious training."' 53 Thus, like the ex-
perience under the UMDA and the "least detrimental alternative,"
spiritual custody, unless explicitly authorized by statute, will only be
awarded if the spiritual caregiver can meet the imposing burden of
establishing that an improper religious environment "will jeopardize
the temporal mental health or physical safety of the child.' 54
Only the rule we have fashioned from the canvassing of the so-
cial sciences will resolve the conflict between Pamela and David.
Given that the children have been raised as Jews for all of their
lives, and have not been exposed to any other religion, Pamela, as
the Jewish parent, should be the "spiritual caregiver," regardless
whether she is also the legal and/or physical custodian of the chil-
dren, and both parents should be supportive in nurturing this reli-
gious environment. But what if David is the legal and physical cus-
todian, or at the very least has shared physical custody or set periods
of visitation? Should he have to participate in the Jewish life of his
children when his own religious preference is to participate in the
Catholic faith? If a court, following our rule, answers in the affirma-
Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R. 4th 971, § 4 (1991). It
should be noted that once a custodian is chosen, the vast majority of states leave the structuring
of the child's religious life to the discretion of the custodian. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d
1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
149. See, e.g., Anhalt v. Fesler, 636 P.2d 224, 226 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Boylan, v.
Boylan, 577 A.2d 218, 219. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("Although religion is an important matter
and should be given some consideration in child custody matters, it is not determinative.").
150. Beschle, supra note 129, at 398.
151. Id.
152. Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875, 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
153. Robert 0. v. Judy E., 395 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977).
154. In re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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tive, David will argue that such a ruling offends the Constitution in
at least three ways. First, by selecting one religious environment for
the child over another, the court is violating the neutrality principle
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Second, by
forcing David to choose between his own religious preferences and
sharing time with his children, the court is violating the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment. And finally, by removing
David's ability to help decide upon the proper religious upbringing
of his children, the court is improperly intruding upon the doctrine
of family privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Are any of these constitutional claims valid, thereby
impugning the legality of our "spiritual caregiver" rule?
1. The Establishment Clause Claim
The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion . . . . -155 Despite its
scarcity of terms, few phrases in the Constitution have been the
source of such endless disagreement, between both jurists and com-
mentators, concerning the provision's precise meaning and scope.'
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The First Amendment was not made
applicable to the states by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and the Establishment
Clause was not specifically applied to the states until Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
156. Though some would wish to consult the "original intent" of the framers, such a
search would be futile. The legislative history is virtually non-existent, see Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 814 (1982)(Brennan, J., dissenting), and judges and historians "have de-
cidedly mixed views about what 'establishment' meant to the framers." Weisman v. Lee, 908
F.2d 1090, 1092 (1st Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J., concurring), affirmed, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992);
see also Donald Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neu-
trality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 ; 120-75 (1987)
(collecting academic interpretations and criticisms). For example, taking only the issue of the
framers' intent, historians have isolated three possible sources: Thomas Jefferson, Roger Wil-
liams, and James Madison.
Jefferson focused on a "wall of separation between church and state" to
protect the state from the church .... Williams thought that a "hedge or wall
of separation [should exist] between the garden of the church and the wilderness
of the world" in order to protect religion from the corruption of the world ....
Madison's view was that competition among sects both religious and political
was in everyone's best interest.
Weisman, 908 F.2d at 1092 n.8. The inconclusive nature of the "original intent" of the fram-
ers led Judge Bownes to conclude that:
[The] ground has been trodden so much that it is barren of meaning and per-
suasive power. The "historical record" is inconclusive on the various cross-cur-
rents in the minds of the framers. Because of the tangled and often conflicting
historical record, it is unlikely that, as an empirical matter, we can ever know
the original intention of the authors of the Constitution.
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Originally, neutrality was the Court's touchstone-government must
neither "advance" nor "inhibit" religion."' However, applying the
neutrality principle-remaining neutral while attempting to resolve
the tension between separation on the one hand and accommodation
on the other-has proven to be a formidable task. The Court, on
several occasions, has drafted or modified specific rules to determine
when government action encroaches upon the Establishment
Clause, 58 with current doctrine advancing the following test: "The
proper inquiry . . . is whether government intends to convey a mes-
sage of endorsement or disapproval of religion, [or] whether a gov-
ernment practice [has] the effect of communicating a message of gov-
ernment endorsement or disapproval of religion.'
59
Professor Beschle has observed that the Court's current jurispru-
dence supports the view that "government may influence or attempt
to influence, without running afoul of the religion clauses, its citi-
zens' beliefs insofar as those beliefs relate to what constitutes tempo-
ral human welfare."' 60 Relying on this interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, we may answer the question whether a court, by
Id. at 1093.
157. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (a statute or practice which
touches upon religion if it is to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, must have a
secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect;
and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion). The classic statement of neu-
trality as the proper mode through which to interpret the Establishment Clause is found in
Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947):
[The] "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or re-
main away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or profess-
ing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect a "wall of separation between
church and State."
Id. at 15-16.
158. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Abington Township Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Lemon, supra note 157.
159. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). This
analytical framework, a variant of the Lemon test, was adopted by a majority of the Court in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989).
160. Beschle, supra note 129, at 181.
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granting religious custody to the spiritual caregiver, is preferring one
religion over another in violation of the First Amendment. Govern-
ment may "influence religious beliefs" if those beliefs "relate to what
constitutes temporal welfare." As already discussed, granting reli-
gious custody to the spiritual caregiver serves to enhance the tempo-
ral welfare of the child at issue, for his or her best interests will be
served by maintaining continuity in the pre-existing religious envi-
ronment. Thus, a court decree awarding religious custody does not
''convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion," but
recognizes a compelling interest in furthering the best interests of the
child whose custody is in dispute. Therefore, contrary to those courts
that have held an award of religious custody might offend the Estab-
lishment Clause, 6 ' under existing law such an award is
161. It is true that "even the most cautious application of the establishment clause"
would require that government not prefer one religion to another. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Out of fear of appearing to favor one religion over
another, some state courts have held or implied that religious custody awards would so offend
the Constitution. See, e.g., Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861, 866 (Idaho 1977) (court re-
versed part of order prohibiting father from providing religious training to his daughter);
Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Wash. 1971) (en banc) (reversing order prohibiting
father from taking children to church); Zummo, supra note 5, at 1146 (stating in dicta that
enforcing a religious custody award would violate the Lemon test).
Most state courts, however, either consider this argument one of free exercise of religion,
as discussed infra note 174 and accompanying text, or as constitutional in somewhat the same
manner as presented here. For example, in Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257 (Md. 1992),
in which a father was prohibited from exposing his daughter to the Baptist religion when the
daughter had been raised as a Lutheran, the court delineated the appropriate boundaries for
judicial interference with the religious upbringing of children who are the subject of custody
proceedings:
When the life or physical safety of a child is threatened, the delicate accom-
modation between religious freedoms and an exercise of state authority is neces-
sarily made. As the threat to the child diminishes, the balancing of interests
becomes more difficult. Accordingly [the courts have required] a clear showing
that a parent's religious practices have been or are likely to be harmful to the
child before allowing judicial interference with those religious practices .... [A]
factual finding of a causal relationship between the religious practices and the
actual or probable harm to a child is required . . . . When the evidence is
sufficient to demonstrate the need for intervention, the remedy should be that
"which intrudes least on the religious inclinations of either parent and is yet
compatible with the health of the child," and should be "narrowly tailorled] ...
so as to result in the least possible intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the parent."
Id. at 261-62 (citations omitted).
Most state courts would agree that when it can be established that a change in religious
environment would be detrimental to the child's welfare, the courts may intervene through
religious custody awards. Indeed, in Funk v. Ossman, 724 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986),
the court, based on evidence less scientific than that presented supra notes 104-26 and accom-
panying text, held that it was in the best interests of the child to continue to be raised in the
Christian faith, his religious environment prior to divorce, because the exposure to Judaism
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constitutional. 6 2
2. The Free Exercise Claim
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . ..prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 10 3 As the Free
Speech Clause has been interpreted as a shield guarding an individ-
ual's freedom of expression, so the Free Exercise Clause has histori-
cally been perceived as the armor between the government and an
individual's conscience regarding matters of religion. However, the
freedom to adhere to a set of religious beliefs is broader in scope
than the freedom to practice in accord with those beliefs."" From its
earliest statements interpreting the religion clauses, the Supreme
Court has consistently maintained that "[e]ven the exercise of reli-
was causing the child emotional distress.
In sum, the majority of state courts would not object to ordering religious custody upon a
showing of harm to the child's general welfare. Without the "spiritual caregiver" rule, most
courts will require a showing of significant endangerment to the well-being of the child. See
supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. With the "spiritual caregiver" rule, one simply
eliminates the harshness of this evidentiary burden by placing the presumption in favor of the
spiritual custodian. The non-custodial parent, with regard to religion, must rebut this pre-
sumption by showing how it is manifestly against the child's wishes or best interests. As noted
in the text above, this approach is within a court's power under the Establishment Clause.
162. The "endorsement" test of County of Allegheny survived Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
Ct. 2649 (1992), in which the Court held that a sectarian benediction or invocation at public
high school graduation violates the Establishment Clause. The Court declined the opportunity
to abandon its prior precedents, finding it unnecessary to reexamine the scope of permissible
state accommodation of religion since the case sits squarely within the Court's rulings on
prayer in the public schools. However, had a different approach been taken, the ensuing test
would have been less exacting than the "endorsement" test. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 655-61 (opinion of Kennedy, J. dissenting).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
164. As the Court observed in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940):
[The] constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the accept-
ance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safe-
guards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is ab-
solute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains sub-
ject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible
end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
Id. at 303-04.
For example, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme Court up-
held the application of a federal law prohibiting polygamy to a Mormon whose religion re-
quired him to engage in that practice, reasoning that "government was free to reach actions
which were in violations of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at 164.
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gion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the [s]tate
may protect its citizens from injury." ' 5 The jurisprudential chal-
lenge has been to create a workable test which allows judges to dis-
cern when a "slight inconvenience" becomes an unconstitutional
burden.
In Sherbert v. Verner 6' the Supreme Court held that "any in-
cidental burden on the free exercise" of religion will not be tolerated
unless the state can demonstrate a "compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's power to regulate."' 67 Ab-
sent such a showing, it is impermissible for a state to condition the
"free exercise of [one's] constitutional liberties" on an adherent's
"willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith."' 8
In Employment Division v. Smith,'69 the Court relaxed its level
of scrutiny of alleged Free Exercise violations for those cases involv-
ing a "valid and neutral law of general applicability, ' ' 70 holding
that:
[The] government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry
out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development." To make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compel-
ling"-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a
law unto himself"-contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense.'17
Smith would seem to foreclose any argument against a spiritual
custody award based on state infringement of the non-custodial par-
ent's right to the free exercise of religion. Like the best interests
standard, the spiritual caregiver rule is a generally applicable prohi-
bition of socially harmful conduct (in this instance, endangering the
temporal welfare of a child). Limiting the right of one parent to
raise, or even expose, his or her child to his or her faith, as well as
the duty to facilitate the religious environment of the child in the
faith of the other spouse, would not be an unconstitutional infringe-
165. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306.
166. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
167. Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 406.
169. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
170. Id. at 1600.
171. Id. at 1603 (citation omitted).
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ment on the burdened parent's religious freedom.
Though Smith bypasses any consideration of Sherbert, were
Sherbert still the applicable test, it is highly likely that a free exer-
cise challenge to the spiritual caregiver rule would still fail. The
state's interest in securing the temporal welfare of a child would be
"compelling," given the demonstrable harm that can result from the
sudden alteration in the child's religious environment.17 2 It is true
that the individual parent would be "burdened," in that he or she
would be unable to practice his or her faith with the child at issue,
and might even have to forego some of his or her visitation schedule
to facilitate the child's religious needs. However, the individual par-
ent would not be limited at all in the pursuit of his or her own
religious life, and would be under no obligation to participate with
the child and the other parent in that religious atmosphere. As an
award of religious custody is a case in which "harm to the physical
or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred,' ' 17' even
under the pre-existing test of strict scrutiny, it would appear the
spiritual caregiver rule would withstand a challenge under the Free
Exercise Clause.17 4
172. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
173. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972).
174. As no state has, as yet, adopted a spiritual caregiver rule, state courts must be
guided by legislatively determined considerations for custody and modification of such an
award. Like the UMDA, most states vest control of the religious upbringing of the child at
issue in the legal custodian, and when custody is shared, courts try either to align the child
with the dominant spiritual custodian or relegate this decision to one of family privacy-even
if that means the child will have dual exposure without consideration of the harm such duality
might cause. See Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases,
supra note 148, § 2 and cases referenced therein.
Despite these rules favoring control by physical proximity, and the courts' general reluc-
tance to "entangle" themselves in religious matters, because many religious conflicts do affect
the welfare of the child, courts have had to decide how to balance parental control, free exer-
cise rights, and the best interests of the child. As a general rule:
[In the majority of American jurisdictions that have considered the question, the
courts have refused to restrain the non custodial parent from exposing the minor
child to his or her religious beliefs and practices absent a clear, affirmative
showing that these religious activities will be harmful to the child .. . .The
refusal to intervene in the absence of a showing of harm to the child reflects the
protected nature of religious activities and expressions of belief, as well as the
proscription against preferring one religion over another.
In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted).
Accord, Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Neb. App. 1987); Felton v. Felton, 418
N.E.2d 606, 607 (Mass. 1981) (harm "should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be
demonstrated in detail"); Robertson v. Robertson, 575 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(harm must not be based on "mere conclusions and speculation"); Compton v. Gilmore, 560
P.2d 861 (Idaho 1977); Khalsa v. Khalsa, 751 P.2d 715 (N.M. 1988); Pater v. Pater, 588
19931
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3. The Family Privacy Claim
A separate and distinct constitutional right of privacy originates
in Griswold v. Connecticut,175 where Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, observed that various freedoms, not explicitly found in
the text of the Constitution, have nevertheless been derived as ele-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rights "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty ...so
rooted in the traditions of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.' 1 76  These various "implicit" freedoms "suggest that specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance.' 77 These "[v]arious guarantees create zone[s] of privacy" so
sacrosanct that a "governmental purpose to control or protect activi-
ties constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ohio 1992); Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 605 A.2d 172, 182 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1992). In Felton the following words of the court indicate the tension which pulls the
court in divergent directions:
The critical literature warns against perverting a quest for the child's best
interests into one for psychic comfort of the parents-a warning against over-
valuing the parents' constitutional liberties. A warning is equally in order
against depriving a parent of all connection with the child, or connection on the
religious plane, out of an exaggerated fear of injury to the child.
Id. at 608 (citations omitted).
Lacking the utility of a spiritual caregiver rule, the courts have failed to produce a coher-
ent rationale for their actions, instead producing fact-specific rulings, appearing to weigh the
constitutional rights of the parents with the best interests of the child, but in reality selecting
the outcome which maximizes the welfare of the child and minimizes acrimony among the
parties. Compare Ledoux v. Ledoux, 452 N.W.2d I (Neb. 1990) (father, a Jehovah's Witness,
must refrain from exposing his children to religious practices or teaching inconsistent with
Baptist religion of the mother) with Peterson v. Peterson, 474 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 1991)
(mother could not be prevented from exposing child to beliefs of her faith, which father charac-
terized as a cult with views which were harmful and confusing to the child). Compare Jacobs
v. Jacobs, 323 N.E.2d 21 (I1. App. Ct. 1974) (Jewish father could not prevent Catholic
mother from exposing child to her faith) with In re Tisckos, 514 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (Baptist father could be directed to bring child to Catholic mother's church since child
was being reared in Catholic faith and was in best interests to do so). See also, S.E.L. v.
J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1989); Barran v. Nayyar; 572 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1991).
Thus, the state court experience with free exercise challenges are cleverly resolved under
the best interests standard, First Amendment platitudes to the contrary. Given the lack of
principled determination in these cases, it would be preferable to adopt the spiritual caregiver
rule, which would bring the true best interests of the child to the fore, and structure any
challenges strictly on grounds of the child's welfare, with the non-custodial parent bearing the
burden of demonstrating why the presumption of the spiritual caregiver rule should not be
followed.
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
176. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
177. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms." ' 8 Thus, the right of privacy is a funda-
mental right, infringement upon which will trigger strict scrutiny to
assure that the state interest is compelling and that the manner cho-
sen to effect this purpose is the least restrictive available alternative.
The right of privacy gives the individual autonomous control
over the personal aspects of life, affairs traditionally thought to be
beyond the reach of even the most intrusive government. Among
these aspects are the freedom to choose a particular lifestyle, includ-
ing the decision whether to marry or procreate.17 9 Concomitant with
the freedom to create a family is the right to structure and order
family life without fear of government interference.
This "doctrine of family privacy" predates Griswold and is
rooted in the belief that the relationship between husband and wife,
parent and child, is an expressly private relationship that should,
except in rare circumstances, be governed by the discretion of its con-
stituent members and not the state. In Meyer v. Nebraska,8 ' the
Court noted that:
[The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those priv-
ileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. 8'
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'82 the Court ex-
panded on the purely private aspects of the parent-child relationship,
stating that the "child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions."' 3 These related strands were unified into the doctrine of
family privacy in Prince v. Massachusetts.'
178. Id. at 484-85.
179. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
180. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
181. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
182. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
183. Id. at 535.
184. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
fre'edom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by re-
quiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's
labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the
child's course of conduct on religion or conscience ...the state
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious
conviction.' 8"
The pinnacle of the doctrine of family privacy was reached in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,"8 6 where the Court held that an Amish family
could refrain from sending their children to high school, in contra-
vention of the state's compulsory attendance statute, because such a
requirement poses a "very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today; they must ei-
ther abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be
forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant religion. 1 8 7 In so
holding, the Court spoke in forceful terms of the sanctity of a parent
to determine his or her child's religious life.
Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parens
patriae, to "save" a child from himself or his Amish parents by
requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high
school education, the State will in large measure influence, if
not determine, the religious future of the child. Even more
markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the funda-
mental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State,
to guide the religious future and education of their children.
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. The primary role of the parents in the upbring-
185. Id. at 166-67.
186. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
187. Id. at 218.
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ing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition. 8
Though reading Pierce to stand "as a charter of the rights of
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children," '189 the
Yoder Court also allowed for limited state interference in this role.
"To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free
exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it ap-
pears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."19 0
Despite the sweeping affirmation of the primacy of the parent
to chart the course of the child's religious upbringing, the state may
limit this authority if it can demonstrate that a parental choice will
threaten the welfare of the child. In applying this "doctrine of family
privacy" to the "spiritual caregiver" rule, it appears that parental
autonomy must yield to the best interests of the child. Given the em-
pirical evidence demonstrating the harm which could result if a
child's religious environment was abruptly restructured," 1 the state,
either by statute or judicial fiat, would be within its constitutional
power as parens patriae to create a presumption in favor of the spir-
itual custodian, rebuttable upon a showing by the non-custodial par-
ent that in this particular case, the presumption under which the
state is operating is wholly inapposite.1 92
4. Additional Problems
Two other possibilities arising out of the scenario involving
Pamela and David need to be addressed. First, prior to their mar-
riage, Pamela and David agreed to raise the children in the Jewish
faith. Should courts afford any binding authority to such antenuptial
188. Id. at 232.
189. Id. at 233.
190. Id. at 233-34.
191. See supra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
192. One might also argue that when the intact family dissolves to the point where the
court has jurisdiction-in divorce decrees and custody awards-parents cede their privacy right
of family autonomy because they have voluntarily sought the assistance of the state in the
resolution of their problems. By doing so, a court need not advance compelling interests for its
invasion upon family privacy-something akin to rational basis would suffice. This argument
applies only to a family in dissolution. For intact families, the court has no reason to entertain
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1971) (where a minor child aban-
dons her home to avoid parental restraint, she forfeits any claim to parental support, and the
court will not intervene, "absent a violation of law," so as not to "undermine the integrity of
the family"); McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (court will not entertain
jurisdiction over a claim of financial support similar to alimony when the parties are still an
intact family and do not demonstrate any desire to cease being one).
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agreements? Second, one child, Adam, is eight years old, and has
been inculcated in Judaism for several years. Given his familiarity
with his religious experience, should Adam, rather than his parents,
be able to decide his religious future? Do children have such a con-
stitutional right? And if so, is Adam mature enough to make this
decision? If not, at what age would a minor be able to select his own
religious life?
a. Religious Upbringing and Antenuptial Agreements
There is a growing trend among courts to recognize antenuptial
agreements, at least with respect to division of marital property and
alimony.' 93 Issues concerning the children, however, are not as fa-
vored, for they encroach upon the state's parens patriae interest in
the welfare of the child-if the court is bound by a pre-existing con-
tract, its ability to award custody within the best interests of the
child is unduly restricted. Indeed, it is primarily for this reason that
antenuptial agreements concerning the child's religious upbringing
are not favored in many states. 9 Several states, however, do recog-
193. See, e.g., DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982)(en banc); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted in 15 states as of
1990, would enforce such agreements with respect to spousal support and marital property,
unless the party against whom the agreement is enforced can prove that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execu-
tion of that agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial
obligation of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure
of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure
provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of
the property or financial obligations of the other party.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a) (1991).
194. See Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, supra
note 148, § 15(a) and cases cited therein. The court in Zummo v. Zummo, noted other reasons
why such contracts are found void:
1) such agreements are generally too vague to demonstrate a meeting of the
minds, or to provide an adequate basis for objective enforcement;
2) enforcement of such an agreement would promote a particular religion, serve
little or no secular purpose, and would excessively entangle the courts in reli-
gious matters; and,
3) enforcement would be contrary to a public policy embodied in the First
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (as well as their state
equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their beliefs,
and that they be free to instruct their children in accordance with those beliefs.
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
SOLOMONIC PARADOX
nize, to some extent, the validity of these agreements, believing that
"agreements in regard to the religious upbringing of a child are de-
sirable and should be encouraged.' 95 New York courts are particu-
larly amenable to such agreements, and will enforce them "to the
extent that they provide for the best interests and welfare of the
child," subject to modification when "confronted with appropriate
evidence that the welfare of the child is not best served by the pre-
marital agreement of the parents."' 96
What should be the general rule concerning antenuptial agree-
ments dealing with a child's religious upbringing? From a therapeu-
tic standpoint, these agreements should be encouraged, for they force
interfaith couples to consider their differences and bring them into
the open before childbirth, thereby minimizing the trauma to the
child.' 97 From a legal standpoint, the courts should weigh the terms
of the agreement as one factor influencing the welfare of the child.
Pre-marital contracts often serve as excellent indicators not only of
the original intent of the parties but also provide the decision maker
a barometer of the degree of continuity in a child's religious environ-
ment. However, these antenuptial agreements should in no sense be
binding or determinative-the court should follow the "spiritual
caregiver" rule and consider the evidence within these antenuptial
agreements only as support for, or reasons against, the presumption
in favor of the spiritual custodian.
b. Minors, Religion, and Constitutional Rights
"Notions of parental authority and family autonomy cannot
stand as absolute and invariable barriers to the assertion of constitu-
tional rights by children."' 98 In fact, "[c]onstitutional rights do not
Though the vagueness of terms and the hesitancy to bind in advance a religious environ-
ment without allowing for change since the signing of the agreement are legitimate reasons, the
use of the First Amendment is a red herring; this is because, as discussed supra notes 155-62
and accompanying text, the Establishment Clause, in the context of a spiritual custody award,
would not be preferring one religion to another, but acting in the best interests of the temporal
welfare of the child.
195. Wagshal v. Wagshal, 238 A.2d 903, 907 (Md. 1968); see also, Stern v. Stern, 188
N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); Sina v. Sina, 402 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Anno-
tation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, supra note 148, § 15(b)
and cases cited therein.
196. Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, N.Y.S.2d 993, 998 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1976); see also
Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1982).
197. See McGoldrick & Preto, supra note 62, at 355-61; MAYER, supra note 13, at
146.
198. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."1 9 Following
this principle, the Supreme Court has found that a minor has the
benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due
process,2"' the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, 20 ' a Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment ,202 a
Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion, 0 8 and a First Amend-
ment right to freedom of expression. 20 ' However, the Court has long
"recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regu-
late the activities of children than of adults."20 5
Given what little guidance the Court has provided with respect
to a child's constitutional rights, would recognition of a minor's free
exercise right support the "spiritual caregiver" rule? Given that mi-
nors do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate, 20 6 one would believe that this
principle should extend to support a minor's free exercise of religion
in his or her home. If a court cannot impede upon one's freedom of
conscience, 207 it seems logical to conclude that this proscription is as
viable for minors as adults. Operating under this premise, would the
"spiritual caregiver" rule violate the child's free exercise rights?
With respect to constitutional autonomy, a child who is the sub-
ject of a custodial award is in a precarious situation. When a court is
awarding legal custody to an adult, the best interests of the child are
paramount; ironically, however, the child is at the mercy of the
court, and his or her wishes will "count" only to the extent the judge
is willing to take them into consideration. If the child wants to live
with the mother, and the court believes the best interests of the child
warrant custody with the father, the child must succumb. The minor
will face a similar indeterminacy with respect to religious environ-
ment-under existing law of the majority of states, the parent who
obtains legal custody will determine the child's religious upbringing,
199. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
200. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
201. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
202. Parham, 442 U.S. at 629.
203. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
204. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
205. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
206. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
207. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
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despite a child's particular preference.2"8 Thus, in the context of a
custodial proceeding, the child's individual constitutional rights be-
come subsumed under a collective general welfare-best interests
standard.
Need this always be the case?
In order to avoid arrogating to itself unconstitutional authority
to declare orthodoxy in determining religious identity, courts
only recognize a legally cognizable religious identity when such
an identity is asserted by the child itself, and then only if the
child has reached sufficient maturity and intellectual develop-
ment to understand the significance of such an assertion.
Though no uniform age of discretion is set, children twelve or
older are generally considered mature enough to assert a reli-
gious identity, while children eight and under are not. With
those ranges as a starting point, judges exercise broad discretion
on a case by case basis in determining whether a child has suffi-
cient capacity to assert for itself a personal religious identity. 09
Let's assume that for those minors deemed mature enough to have
formed an independent religious identity, the court will take this into
account. Will the preference be absolute? Just as a parent's constitu-
tional right to free exercise may be limited by a "compelling" state
interest, so will the free exercise right of a minor. Hence, even with
the asserted identity of a mature minor, unless the minor is emanci-
pated,210 his or her constitutional right will be but a preference ex-
pressed to the court, whose "compelling" interest is the welfare of
the child.2 '
Given these conclusions, is there any benefit at all to recogniz-
ing a free exercise right in a minor, regardless of whether he or she
has formed a religious identity? There is one possible benefit.2"2 If
208. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
209. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See also, Note,
The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into
the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702, 1727-32 nn.85-109 (1984).
210. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1149.
211. If the custody determination is considered a law of general applicability, then
under the standard announced in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
court need not even recognize the minor's mature religious identity under the Free Exercise
Clause.
212. "Possible" refers to the tenuous constitutional precedent for this discussion. In
Yoder, the Court left unresolved the issue whether children had constitutional rights pertaining
to religious education which could be asserted against parents. Compare the majority's hesi-
tancy, 406 U.S. at 231-32, with Justice Douglas' firm belief in this principle, 406 U.S. at 241-
46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). In Parham, a majority in dicta strongly suggested such a
right would not exist, 442 U.S. 603-04.
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every minor who was the subject of a custody award had an explicit
free exercise right, this would provide additional constitutional sup-
port for a "spiritual caregiver" rule. When giving the presumption
of religious custody to the spiritual caregiver, a court will not be
acting on the basis of empirical evidence demonstrating the harm to
the child's temporal welfare if his or her religious environment were
disrupted. Instead, the court would be proceeding on the presump-
tion that the only way a minor will in all probability develop, at
some point in the future, a positive religious identity of his or her
own free choice, is if the child continues to be raised in the healthiest
possible religious environment until emancipation. So understood,
such a recognition of a minor's First Amendment right to the free
exercise of religion will, if nothing else, identify symbolically both
the true rationale behind, and beneficiary of, the "spiritual
caregiver" rule.
V. CONCLUSION: "LORD PROTECT MY CHILD"
He's young and on fire,
Full of hope and desire
In a world that's been raped and defiled.
If I fall along the way,
And can't see another day,
Lord, Protect My Child.
There'll be a time I here tell
When all will be well
When God and man will be reconciled.
But until men lose their chains
And righteousness reigns,
Lord, Protect My Child. 213
Suzanne LaFollette has written that "when one hears the argu-
ment that marriage should be indissoluble for the sake of children,
one cannot help wondering whether the protagonist is really such a
firm friend of childhood."" 4 Ironically, divorce at the end of the
twentieth century may be remembered as both a form of liberation
for adults and a means of disassociation for children. In spite of the
growing tolerance of, and even appreciation for, alternative lifestyles
and various nontraditional families, the weight of the sociological,
213. BOB DYLAN, Lord, Protect My Child, on THE BOOTLEG SERIES: VOLUMES 1-3
(Columbia Records 1991).
214. Suzanne LaFollette, Women and Marriage, in CONCERNING WOMEN (1926),
quoted in David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 216 (1986).
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anthropological, and psychological research, as we have seen, indi-
cates that continuous contact with a nucleus of significant others is
vital to socialization and self-efficacy in child development. Unfortu-
nately, the focus on enhancing the subjective well-being of the adult
in contemporary relationships 'has overshadowed the need to deal
with the devastation the collapse of the nuclear family has heaped
upon the unemancipated generation. And worse, our legal system
has heightened the tumult surrounding dissolution by emphasizing
its adversarial nature instead of nurturing its capacity for compas-
sionate transition.
Increasing numbers of children growing up in dysfunctional
families-is this the legacy our generation must inherit? This is not
an exercise in hyperbole but a sad reality we as a society must con-
front. In our rush to free ourselves from Victorian bonds, in our zeal
to sate the passions of the id, children have become casualties of our
revolution. And the legal system has facilitated the decline, paradoxi-
cally, by expanding the frontier of our civil liberties.
Rather than serve as an indictment of our state of affairs, this
brief excursion can act as a catalyst for social and legal evolution.
Liberation from our repressed notions of patriarchal society is a pos-
itive accomplishment of the American Enlightenment. However, we
must now reconstruct what we have deconstructed, and synthesize
the openness toward nontraditional family structures with the funda-
mental, inherently human need for collective validation, the symbio-
sis of membership in and enrichment of the community.
If what a large proportion of modern American society is con-
fronting is a crisis of meaning, spirituality can play a central role in
filling this existential void. But the rapture of which we speak is not
a purely personal, transcendental epiphany. Rather, it is a socio-cul-
tural phenomenon which, to be realized, requires an integration into
an expanding set of concentric circles around the self, each circle a
component in the development of a sense of self-efficacy, each move
out a sign of increased socialization and self-actualization.
Children, as we have seen, are experiencing this disconnected-
ness, especially those who must undergo some family transformation.
And this loss of subjective well-being is heightened in the exogamous
family, for the social tensions which all must confront are inflamed,
and even acted out, through ethnic and religious differences. To pre-
vent the animosity and discord that peaks at separation and dissolu-
tion, the least the parents, and the law, can give these children is an
innate sense of self, a spiritual continuity which will empower their
personality through a difficult period of adjustment. This can be ac-
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complished, consonant with both the social science literature on reli-
gious development and the constitutional protections of religious
freedom and family privacy, through the adoption by the states of
the following Uniform Spiritual Caregiver Act.
UNIFORM SPIRITUAL CAREGIVER ACT
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Act-
(a) "Spiritual Caregiver" is that parent who will have exclusive
responsibility for, and control over, the development of the religious
environment of the child at issue;
(b) "Principal Spiritual Custodian" is that parent whose faith
most closely resembles the religious upbringing the child at issue has
had prior to dissolution;
(c) "Primary Caregiver" is that parent who, on a continuing,
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, has been primarily responsible for fulfilling the child's
pyschological and physical needs.
SECTION 2. LEGAL DETERMINIATION OF SPRIRITUAL CAREGIVER.
In every proceeding in which legal custody of a minor child is at
issue, the court shall make a separate and distinct determination as
to the child's spiritual caregiver, guided by the following:
(a) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. In cases of divorce, the court
will presume the spiritual caregiver is the principal spiritual custo-
dian. If the child's religious indentity resembles neither parent, the
court will presume that the primary caregiver is the spiritual
caregiver.
(b) CONDITIONS FOR REBUTTAL. Whichever presumption in
subsection (a) applies, it shall be rebuttable upon presentation of evi-
dence of other factors, including the preference of the child ifjudged
to be mature enough to have formed a religious identity, which indi-
cate selecting the principal spiritual cusodian (or primary caregiver)
as the spiritual caregiver is against the best interests of the child.
Adoption of this Uniform Spiritual Caretaker Act will not be a
universal panacea for the plethora of ills which plague the child in
contemporary society. It will, however, increase the likelihood that
the child thrust into family transition will not become permanently
displaced, but instead will be empowered with sufficient ego
strengths-a positive sense of self, an enhanced self-efficacy-to nur-
ture social integration and transform the child from the role of victim
of the post-modern family to that of its champion.
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